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January 5, 2026 — No Comments

Extremist Convergence and Antisemitism: Security Challenges in the Italian Context

By Francesco Foti - Italy Team

In Western democratic systems, it is customary to promote spaces for pluralistic debate on sociopolitical phenomena. However, given the security threats arising from political polarisation and radicalisation dynamics, it is important to make a rigorous distinction between political criticism and discriminatory rhetoric, and to apply continuous monitoring of extremism and extremist actors seeking to destabilise Italyโ€™s democratic fabric, without compromising individual rights. 

According to the Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC), in 2024 there were 877 antisemitic incidents recorded โ€” nearly double the 454 incidents in 2023. The increase includes both online hate speech (insults, slurs, threats) and real-world episodes: vandalism, physical assaults, threats to Jewish individuals, and attacks against Jewish institutions. The escalation coincides with international events โ€” in particular, the war in Gaza and the October 7, 2023 massacre by Hamas โ€” which have fuelled a surge in โ€œanti-Zionistโ€ protests that often overlapped with classic antisemitic tropes and rhetoric.

The pro-Palestinian protests that have fuelled antisemitism are said by some analysts to originate from the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the current far-left political thought prevalent among many commentators, activists, and political groups. The UCOII has been linked to this influence. The organisation includes the USMI (Unione degli Studenti Musulmani in Italia), which plays a significant role in the funding of mosques in Italy. According to some investigative reports, this group works closely with extra-parliamentary far-left and anarchist circles. A 2025 academic study mapping the Italian Telegram ecosystem found evidence that far-left and far-right rhetoric sometimes mix in chats; it also identified widespread toxicity and hate speech targeting Jews among other groups.

Some intelligence and counter-extremism sources associate the UCOII with FIOE โ€” the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe โ€” which is often described as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, some analysts warn that the legal and institutional framework in Italy does not sufficiently regulate Islamist and charity associations, potentially leaving room for greater ideological influence and individuals of concern.

It is therefore important to identify the presence of political Islam operating covertly within anti-Israel protests. These underlying strategies are consistent with the goals of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, who have historically found fertile ground in universities, political centers, and youth movements.

The recent episodes of antisemitism indicate that the radicalisation of receptive individuals is well underway. All of this suggests that increased security measures and surveillance of sensitive sites โ€” such as synagogues, Jewish centers, and even non-Jewish places that may hold symbolic value for extremists or sleeper cells โ€” should be accompanied by a counter-narrative exposing the alleged role of the Muslim Brotherhood in anti-Israel protests.

The U.S. State Department decision to designate Antifa and other far-left organisations as terrorist groups has been described as a step forward by some observers. However, this would also require the formal designation of organisations and movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood as extremist. The objective should be to formally declare Hamas-linked entities incompatible with the values of the State and a threat to collective security, especially in a period marked by Islamist attacks and extremism elsewhere in Europe.

In recent years, Italian public debate has seen a rise in hostile expressions toward Israel, often presented as legitimate political criticism. Anti-Zionismโ€”understood as opposition to the State of Israel as a political-state projectโ€”and antisemitism, which aims to delegitimise or demonise the Jewish community as such, appear to be inseparably linked. In various contexts, this dividing line is increasingly blurred: slogans, symbols, and narratives adopted in certain public demonstrations show a tendency to overlap judgments about the Israeli government with stigmatising representations of Jewish identity, fostering a climate of hostility that cannot be ignored.

Photo by Mohamed elamine M'siouri, pixels.com

At the same time, part of the security analysis reveals an additional element: the possibility that organisations or individuals linked to international extremist groups may attempt to allegedly channel funds to Hamas or insert themselves into street mobilisations characterised by a strong anti-Israel orientation. These last ones would be opportunistic attempts to exploit emotionally polarised contexts in order to amplify messages or recruit sympathisersโ€”a phenomenon already observed in other parts of Europe. Potential infiltration should be regarded as a risk scenario that requires monitoring and analysis based on verified sources.

The boundary between freedom of protest, political criticism, and incitement to hatred is particularly delicate in an international context marked by strong tensions. The adoption of radicalised slogans, the use of ambiguous symbols, or the presence of narratives that justify violence against civiliansโ€”regardless of their nationality or affiliationโ€”contribute to normalising forms of extremism that could take root in public debate. In this framework, Italy is not exempt from the risks affecting many European societies: the growth of polarising discourse can foster the marginalisation of Jewish communities and fuel hostility, with potential repercussions for social cohesion.

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December 26, 2025 — No Comments

China-US Pause in Busan: Divorce in the Age of Supply Chains

By Carlotta Rinaudo - China & Asiaย Team

The trade war between the United States and China increasingly resembles a failed divorce: expensive, chaotic, and ultimately impossible to finalize. Both sides threaten separation only to discover they are too deeply entangled to walk away: in October 2025 in Busan, the two unwilling partners found themselves forced back under the same marital roof. To make sense of this strange and dysfunctional relationship, over time many analysts have turned to an unexpected field: couple psychology. 

Some analysts describe the relationship as a pragmatic partnership that dates back to the 1970s, forged out of necessity rather than mutual trust or alignment. The United States was burdened by the huge costs of the Vietnam War and a period of stagflation. Prices were rising, workersโ€™ salaries were not, and consumption, the very engine of the American economy - was under threat. China, on the other side of the Pacific, was poor, isolated, and hungry for growth. The stage was set for what Zeno Leoni calls a โ€œmarriage of convenienceโ€: two countries using one another as a quick fix for weaknesses they could not resolve alone. As Han Feizi puts it, it was an unlikely relation built on a clear imbalance: on one side, a weak country would work its way out of poverty, save aggressively, and lend money to a rich partner with a reckless spending habit โ€“ who would then use that money to buy even more of the poor countryโ€™s products. Strange as it sounded, the arrangement worked.

Walmart aisles quickly filled with low-cost clothes, toys, electronics, and household goods, contributing to affordable consumerism during a period of stagnant wages for many. Products that once felt like luxuries became accessible to most American families. For China, the benefits were just as tangible. American demand kept factories running, while millions of rural workers migrated to the coast in search of jobs that offered them a way out of poverty. Dollars flowed from US consumers to Chinese factories and then flowed back to Washington as purchases of US debt, allowing Americans to borrow and consume even more. As Stephen Roach said, China gave Americans a way to โ€œrepeal the basic laws of economicsโ€: they could โ€œlive beyond their means, and that enabled the Chinese to do the same.โ€ 

Like many toxic relationships, however, this marriage of convenience also amplified each partnerโ€™s worst imbalances. In the United States, easy access to cheap imports deepened debt and hollowed out industrial towns like Martinsville, Virginia, where textile factories closed, jobs disappeared, and communities were left behind as production shifted overseas. In China, the costs were even more visible: rivers were polluted, air quality was deteriorated, and laborers were overworked. Also, like in human relationships, over time Chinaโ€™s behavior changed in ways that left the other feeling insecure. No longer a poor country desperate for jobs and dollars, China gradually became an industrial and technological powerhouse. With that rise came confidence, nationalism, and a growing desire to assert itself on the global stage. Also, China was no longer confined to filling Walmart aisles with cheap goods: now it began competing in advanced sectors once dominated by the US โ€“ from AI and telecommunications to robotics. For Washington, this shift in balance triggered something like an identity crisis, which brings us to the mutual resentment, finger-pointing, anxiety and suspicion we are seeing today. In human terms, this is often the stage that leads to separation, and the United States first attempted to follow that script. Washington began to openly speak of decoupling - a necessary โ€œsurgical strikeโ€ to reduce dependence on China, de-risk critical supply chains, and bring manufacturing jobs back home. US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick went so far as to imagine an โ€œarmyโ€ of workers assembling iPhones in the United States. The attempted separation reached its peak on what was called โ€œLiberation Dayโ€, when President Donald Trump imposed tariffs of up to 145% on Chinese products โ€“ to which China promptly responded. 

Yet this tit-for-that soon revealed how separation between two economic giants can be messy, expensive, and ultimately self-defeating. Tariffs were not deployed like precision weapons, but more like land mines, harming almost everyone in their way. American workers and consumers โ€“ those the measures were meant to protect โ€“ quickly found themselves caught in the middle. Chinese-manufactured toys that once sold for $21.99 now cost $35, forcing long-standing toy storesin Manhattan to close. Farmers across the Midwest saw sales collapse as China restricted purchases of US soybeans. Nvidia, the crown jewel of American AI, lost billions of dollars in revenue due to restrictions on chip sales - money that could have been reinvested in domestic research. Even more, those same restrictions accelerated Chinaโ€™s push toward technological self-sufficiency. 

The deeper lesson, however, goes beyond tariffs. In todayโ€™s interconnected supply chains, economic measures often have ripple effects, meaning that actions taken against a partner can have unintended consequences for both sides. Donald Trump often speaks of goods as if they were either โ€œMade in Chinaโ€ or โ€œMade in America,โ€ yet while that worldview made sense in the industrial economy of the twentieth century, it does not make sense in the reality we live in today. In the age of container shipping and digital coordination, almost nothing is fully โ€œmadeโ€ in one place only: products are, more often than not, assembled from components sourced across multiple countries. Huawei - often depicted as the embodiment of โ€œMade in Chinaโ€ โ€“ actually relies heavily on US firms such as Qualcomm and Broadcom for some of its components, and for years its operating system was Googleโ€™s Android. This means that sanctions aimed at Huawei inevitably end up harming US companies too. Such is the power of the supply chain in the 21st century. 

Photo by mohamed_hassan (pixabay.com)

Rare earths offer an even starker example of how US attempts to project strength can expose new vulnerabilities at home. China controls much of the global supply chain of these critical materials, essential for everything from electric vehicles to advanced weapon systems. When Beijing restricted exports in retaliation for US tariffs, the consequences were immediate. To mention one, Ford shut down a factory in Chicago after it was unable to secure the rare earths needed for electric motors. Research showed that it would take eight to twelve years to rebuilding domestic refining capacity of these materials โ€“ if Americans would be willing to shoulder the dirty business of rare earth refining itself. Looking at Baotoutoday, a dry town in Chinaโ€™s Inner Mongolia, it is clear that reshoring production would mean accepting environmental costs that Americans have long outsourced to China. In Baotou, decades of processing have poisoned groundwater and produced a โ€œcancer epidemicโ€ throughout what they are now known as โ€œcancer villages.โ€ 

In October 2025, President Trump and President Xi Jinping met in Busan. The meeting felt less like a resolution and more like a tacit recognition of limits. Leading a slowing economy, Xi urged Trump to learn from the recent โ€œtwists and turnsโ€ of the trade war. On his side, Trump agreed to cut tariffs to 47% and called a โ€œceasefireโ€ on further escalation. Beijing, in turn, suspended restrictions on rare earth exports for one year. It was, overall, a pause that restored a fragile status quo while leaving the underlying tensions intact. Yet the Busan meeting made one reality impossible to ignore. Over decades, the US and China built production systems projected to function together โ€“ one side designing, consuming, and spending; the other manufacturing, assembling, and absorbing the environmental cost. That same structure is now dictating the terms of the relationship for both partners. In a supply-chain world, even an unhappy and suffocating marriage can be cheaper to endure than to escape. And for two unwilling partners forced together by necessity rather than affection, learning how to live together may eventually prove easier than walking away.

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December 25, 2025 — No Comments

The Rise of Southeast Asia as a Global Manufacturing Hub

By Dejvi Dedaj - South East Asia and Oceania Team

Introduction

Southeast Asia, once regarded as a periphery to the global manufacturing systems, has quickly become a core centre of the world production. Geopolitical tensions, in particular the U.S.-China trade war, increased labour costs in China, and the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic have made multinational companies reconsider their supply chains, moving production to new ASEAN economies like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

This change is not just a geographic change, but a structural change in the global economy. The integration of the region into international supply chains has been enhanced by competitive labour markets, improved infrastructure and extensive trade agreements such as Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which have increased resilience and efficiency. Meanwhile, the growing financial ecosystem of Southeast Asia, including advanced capital markets, green and infrastructure financing, facilitates industrial development and innovation. But the emergence of the region is not without problems. The complex environment companies and governments have to operate in to maintain long-term growth is indicated by infrastructure gaps, human capital constraints, and geopolitical uncertainties.

The Forces Behind the Shift

The shift of the global manufacturing to Southeast Asia is due to several convergent forces. The post-2018 global trade environment has become characterized by geopolitical diversification, which has changed the way multinational companies organize their supply chains. The escalation of tariffs and the growing political tension between the United States and China posed greater uncertainty to the companies that had a high concentration of production in one country. The trade barriers, regulatory uncertainty, and the threat of disruption of supply at any time made companies rethink the stability of their current networks. Companies have responded by diversifying production in more than one country to minimize exposure to geopolitical shocks and safeguard the continuity of their operations. Their strategic location in Asia, comparatively open trade policies and integration into regional trade agreements have made neighbouring economies like Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia attractive alternatives. This change is indicative of a larger trend in the global supply chain strategy, where risk reduction and operational flexibility are now as important as cost efficiency in investment and production decisions.

The COVID-19 pandemic further supported the urgency of this diversification strategy. The crisis demonstrated the fragility of over-centralised supply chains and the strategic need of flexible, geographically dispersed production networks. Businesses realised that dependence on one nation, even as productive as China, could bring the world to a standstill. As a result, the geopolitical tensions and the vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic increased the pace of investment in ASEAN economies, as companies tried to establish resilient, diversified, and regionally balanced supply chains.

Moreover, Increasing labour expenses in China have emerged as one of the major reasons that have led to the outsourcing of manufacturing to Southeast Asia. In the last ten years, the wages in the manufacturing centres in China have gone up significantly making the country less competitive in terms of cost in labour intensive industries. Conversely, other Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam and Indonesia are still providing relatively lower labour costsand thus are viable alternatives to industries such as textiles, electronics assembly and consumer goods. As a result, multinational companies that wish to remain cost effective and at the same time remain near the established supply chains are increasingly shifting production to Southeast Asia where an emerging industrial base is supplemented by favourable labour conditions.

Figure 1: Evolution of Chinaโ€™s Average Wages

Source: Trading Economics (2024)

Lastly, bilateral free trade agreements and the RCEP have greatly strengthened the regional supply chain connectivity in the Asia-Pacific. RCEP, which encompasses approximately 30 percent of the world GDP, enables the smooth flow of intermediate goods and investment among member economies by harmonising trade rules and reducing tariffs. This structure allows the multinational companies to spread the production to multiple countries in Asia without losing preferential access to the market, which makes it more resilient to geopolitical or pandemic-related shocks. The bilateral agreements like the Japan-Thailand EPA and the Indonesia-Korea CEPA are also complementary and enhance market integration and investment opportunities. Collectively, these institutional arrangements support the transition of the region to interdependent and elastic supply chains.

Financial and Economic Implications

The economic consequences of the manufacturing transformation in Southeast Asia go way beyond the relocation of industries, they are an indication of the new financial geography. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined globally, ASEAN has registered its third year of consecutive growth in the region, while its stock increased by 56% since 2014, reaching $3.9 trillion. The major forces were the increased investorsโ€™ interest in finance, renewable energy, electric vehicles (EVs), and the reorganization of the supply chain. Financial sector was the largest inflow, which rose to $92 billion, and R&D activities were increasing rapidly, primarily in Singapore. Even though manufacturing FDI fell a little, it was still significant, representing 66% of all greenfield investments, indicating that ASEAN is still a manufacturing and innovation centre in the world.

Figure 2: Global FDI Flows, 2021โ€“2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Figure 3: ASEAN FDI Flows, 2021โ€“2023 (Billions of US Dollars and Year-on-Year % Change)

Source: UNCTAD (2024)

These changes are not just operational but reflect more fundamental financial rebalances that have been the basis of the rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing centre in the world. The capital markets in the region are also getting more sophisticated, which allows domestic companies to have a wider range of financing options and become more integrated into the global supply chains. The swift increase in green and sustainability bond issuance, including Singapore which leads the ASEANโ€™s US$7.8 billion green bond market and Vietnam reaching $1.5 billion in 2021, is an example of the growing financial infrastructure that facilitates industrial growth. The fact that Singapore is a regional financial centre also supports the cross-border trade finance and green financing programs, and other countries such as Malaysia and Thailand are also enhancing domestic markets to fund corporate investment. These financial innovations offer the required liquidity, sustainability orientation and capital depth to maintain the industrial and supply chain transformation in the region.

Financing of infrastructure is also very important in maintaining the growth of manufacturing in the Southeast Asia. TheADB and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are development institutions that have increased investments in logistics and energy infrastructure, which has facilitated the industrial transformation of the region. In 2015-2023, ADB and AIIB together invested billions of dollars in transport, power, and connectivity projects in ASEAN. The modernization of the deep-water ports in Vietnam, trans-island logistics corridors in Indonesia and the Eastern Economic Corridor in Thailand are increasing production capacity and intra-regional trade. Such projects do not only improve physical connectivity, but also bring in private capital in the form of public-private partnerships, which forms a basis of long-term supply chain resilience.

The transformation further extends into digital financial systems. Local payment systems are being integrated through regional payment linkages, e.g. the cooperation between Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to enable quicker, less expensive and more secure cross-border payments. These links lower the transaction costs and contribute to the increase of financial inclusion, particularly among micro, small, and medium enterprises. This financial digitalisation increases the efficiency of trade and is a strong complement to the physical integration which has been attained through diversification of the supply chain. 

Photo by Aqsa Adha: pixels.com

Difficulties and Structural Constraints

In spite of such achievements, the development of Southeast Asia as a global manufacturing hub is associated with a number of structural issues that may jeopardize its sustainability in the long run. Among the most urgent problems, infrastructure gaps are still present. Although developed economies like Singapore and Malaysia have advanced their global logistics, port, and digital networks, others, especially in the Mekong subregion, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, are still grappling with poor transport, energy, and digital infrastructure. According to the estimates of the ADB, ASEAN needs more than $2.8 trillion of infrastructure investment between 2023 and 2030 to address the projected economic and population growth. Persistent gaps in connectivity increase transit times, raise shipping and energy costs, and fragment supply chains that rely on just-in-time production. In addition, the disparity in the quality of infrastructure between the coastal and the inland regions restricts the possibility of industrial diversification outside of the major urban centres, which results in development imbalances that inhibit inclusive growth.

The lack of human capital and skills also limits the long-term competitiveness of the region. With the global manufacturing shifting to more high-value, technology-intensive manufacturing, Southeast Asia is experiencing a shortage of skilled engineers, data specialists, and technicians. Whereas other economies such as Singapore and Malaysia have invested a lot in technical education and research and development, others are lagging behind, with the vocational training systems being out of sync with industry requirements. World Bank and ADB reports indicate that a large percentage of the ASEAN workforce will need to be reskilled by 2030 to meet Industry 4.0 technologies, especially in digital, technical, and high-value manufacturing jobs. In the absence of strategic investments in education, STEM programmes, and workforce mobility, most countries will continue to be reliant on low-cost, labour-intensive production, instead of moving towards innovation-based growth.

Lastly, the geopolitical uncertainty is looming large over the rise of Southeast Asia. The same dynamics that have driven its expansion, U.S.-China competition and the global drive towards supply chain diversification, are also the ones that put it at risk of volatility. The trade restrictions, technological decoupling, or regional tensions in the South China Sea could disrupt production networks and deter foreign investment. The strategic neutrality of ASEAN and the enhancement of its collective voice in the multilateral forums will be critical to the stability and investor confidence. The effects of global fragmentation can be reduced through initiatives that strengthen transparency, supply chain security, and financial resilience.

Conclusion

The rise of Southeast Asia as a manufacturing hub in the world is an indication of a strategic repositioning of production, finance, and innovation. The geopolitical tensions, increasing costs in China, and vulnerability to the pandemic have increased the pace of investment in the region, whereas trade agreements, infrastructure, and financial development contribute to the growth. However, there are still obstacles, such as skill shortages and infrastructure differences, and geopolitical risks. The long-term success will involve aligned policies, strong supply chains, and human and physical capital investments.

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December 11, 2025 — No Comments

The U.S. pressure and the Venezuelaโ€“Colombia Connection

By Giovanni Giacalone - Central and South America Desk

On October 24, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasuryโ€™s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the President of Colombia Gustavo Petro, his wife, his son, and Petroโ€™s close associate, Armando Benedetti, over accusations of involvement in the global drug trade.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement. โ€œPetro has allowed drug cartels to flourish and refused to stop this activityโ€ฆPresident Trump is taking strong action to protect our nation and make clear that we will not tolerate the trafficking of drugs into our nation.โ€

Following the sanctions announcement, Petro named an attorney and stated that he will battle the measure taken by Washington. The Colombian President also praised his approach to countering narcotics: โ€œCombating drug trafficking effectively for decades brings me this measure from the government of the society we helped so much to stop its use of cocaineโ€ฆQuite a paradox, but not one step back and never on our knees.โ€

In September, the United States added Colombia to a list of countries failing to cooperate in the war on drugs, for the first time since the Pablo Escobar era.

Gustavo Petro, a former far-left guerrilla leader, claims that his counter-narcotics policy is utilizing a non-repressive approach that prioritises reaching agreements with coca leaf farmers in order to convince them to cultivate other types of crops while, at the same time, using law enforcement to hunt down drug dealers.

However, according to UN data from the Office on Drugs and Crime, the amount of land dedicated to coca cultivation has almost tripled in the past decade to a record 253,000 hectares (625,000 acres) in 2023. Colombia provides around 90% of the cocaine that is sold every year in the U.S.

The Cartel de los Soles

While the Colombian President is accused of failing to cooperate in the drug war, with Colombia being the primary cocaine provider, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and his close associates are accused by the U.S. of leading the drug distribution network through the Cartel de los Soles, transporting the merchandise to Mexico, the final distributor.

In July 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Maduro (indicated as the leader of the Cartel), Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez, and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello Rondon. Other senior regime figures had already been blacklisted in 2020. President Trump has also placed a bounty on Maduroโ€™s head, offering $US50 million for information leading to his arrest.

A drug trafficking organisation formed by high-ranking members of the Venezuelan state and armed forces, the Cartel de los Soles emerged in 1993, when two National Guard generals were investigated for drug trafficking. As brigade commanders, they wore a sun as their insignia, hence the name "Cartel de los Soles." Initially, the group was called "Grupo Fenix," and consisted primarily of majors, colonels, and lower-ranking military personnel. Over time, however, senior officers began to enter the fray, taking control of the trafficking ring and eliminating the lower ranks. The Cartel de los Soles was designated by the Trump administration as a โ€œForeign Terrorist Organisationโ€ in November 2025.

The weak Petro-Maduro political alliance

In August 2025, after the sanctions imposed by Washington on Maduro and his associates, Colombian President Gustavo Petro expressed his support for the Venezuelan leader, claiming that โ€œColombia and Venezuela are the same people, the same flag, the same historyโ€ and that โ€œany military operation that is not approved by our sister countries is an aggression against Latin America and the Caribbean.โ€ Petro also referred to Simon Bolivarโ€™s call โ€œfreedom or death,โ€ further revealing his attempt to bring Colombia closer to Venezuela.

Since being elected president of Colombia in August 2022, Gustavo Petro has gradually sought to distance the country from Western alliances and position himself alongside Maduro and the Bolivarian Alliance. This shift is unsurprising given his past as a member of the M-19, a far-left armed group founded in the 1970s and inspired by the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros. At its height in the mid-1980s, the M-19 was the second largest armed group in Colombia, after the FARC, with the number of active members estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000. The M-19 demobilised in the late 1980s and transitioned to electoral politics.

Former Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon recently urged the U.S Presidency not to cut off all counter-narcotics aid to Colombia and hike tariffs, because this would affect the Colombian population as well as the military and law enforcement still operating on the frontline against narco-terrorism. 

Pinzon instead suggested implementing sanctions against specific individuals who work in support of drug trafficking. This was done a few days later with the sanctions against Petro.

Pinzon was correct in that the situations in Colombia and Venezuela are extremely different and cannot be addressed with the same approach.

Venezuela has been a Bolivarian stronghold for decades, first under Chรกvez and then under Maduro. U.S. authorities contend that Venezuela has taken on a larger role in regional drug trafficking and has strengthened its ties with Iran, developments that have contributing to instability in the region.  Under Maduro, Hezbollah's presence has proliferated in the country, becoming the main launching pad for drug trafficking to the United States.

Colombia, for its part, has always been a staunch ally of Washington, both in the fight against drug trafficking and against terrorism. The Colombian armed forces are trained by the United States and have been working together since the war against the Medellรญn and Cali cartels in the 1990s. 

In 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected president, but despite his efforts, he was unable to separate the country's institutions from Washington. It's no coincidence that during the recent attempted attack by far-left protesters on the US Embassy in Bogotรก, Petro had no choice but to deploy riot police to repel the attack, drawing criticism from his own supporters.

Critics argue that Petroโ€™s government could face increasing internal challenges, and sanctions will certainly help. As for Maduro, however, some debate whether increased U.S. engagement may be required in the future, assuming Trump doesn't change his mind at the last minute.

Photo by Altamart, on pexels

Rising Tensions in the Region

The United States has deployed a massive military force of approximately 10,000 U.S. soldiers, most of them at bases in Puerto Rico, but also a contingent of Marines on amphibious assault ships, as well as F-35 fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, eight warships, and a submarine.

US navy ships and aircrafts have been sighted just a few hundreds of miles off the coast of Venezuela, while the US has been conducting raids against more narco-speed boats leaving the coasts of Colombia and Venezuela.

Moreover, the US Navy announced the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, Americaโ€™s largest warship, had arrived in the US Southern Command area of operations after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Ford to head to the Caribbean from Europe in late October.

On the other side, this past week, Venezuela has announced a large-scale mobilisation of troops, weapons, and equipment in response to what it calls a growing U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez said land, air, naval, and reserve forces will conduct exercises through Wednesday, describing the operation as a response to what he termed the โ€œimperialist threatโ€ posed by the United States. The maneuvers will also include participation from the Bolivarian militia, a civilian reserve force aligned with the Maduro regime.

Whether all this mobilisation by the US serves merely to pressure the leader to resign peacefully or is instead instrumental in a regime change operation is another matter.

A full-scale U.S. invasion akin to the 1989 operation in Panama is highly improbable given Venezuelaโ€™s circumstances. The countryโ€™s vast size and complex geography, characterised by mountainous regions and dense jungle, provide ideal conditions for prolonged guerrilla warfare. Moreover, Venezuelaโ€™s armed forces are significantly more organised and capable than Panamaโ€™s were at the time. In addition, the Trump administration has shown little inclination to initiate new military conflicts.

A more plausible scenario for U.S. involvement might involve indirect support for a domestic uprising against the current regime, potentially through covert operations led by the Central Intelligence Agency, which may or may not already be active within Venezuelan territory.

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December 10, 2025 — No Comments

The growing issues of violence against women in the cyber domain

By Maria Makurat - Human Rights Desk

Introduction

This year the 16 days of activism end gender-based violence last from the 25thย of November to the 10thย of December 2025. Especially this year, the call toย end specifically violence against women in the cyber domainย is a strong focus. The cyber domain is proving to cause many challenges and hurdles for issues in the areas of womenโ€™s rights, human trafficking, child pornography, international conflicts and many more. Australia for instance has taken the big step of banning social media for youth under the age of 16. The UN and other associated organisations haveย raised the alarmย that the online violence which includes for example deepfakes, sextortion, stalking and bullying against women to name a few are increasing. Furthermore, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has released its landmark report, statingย โ€œNearly 1 in 3 women โ€“ estimated 840 million globally โ€“ have experienced partner or sexual violence during their lifetime, a figure that has barely changed since 2000.โ€ย It is essential to continue collecting the data in order to keep track of trends and where to exactly tackle the issues however as is also pointed out, the danger lies in cutting funds and support for such research whenย โ€œ(โ€ฆ) just as when humanitarian emergencies, technological shifts, and rising socio-economic inequality are further increasing risks for millions of women and girls.โ€

The data is essential when one also thinks about what methods and schools of thought can be applied from international relations in order to analyse these trends. Many factors play a role when tackling this issue such as international conflicts, socio-economic factors and political aspects. How are schools of thought such as realism, constructivism, feminism and liberalism placed? Is there a connection? This article aims to analyse this and suggest possible future questions that need to be asked.

Schools of thought surrounding gender and international relationsย 

In International relations as well as international affairs once has the main theoretical pillars: realism, liberalism and constructivism. These have been shaping the debates, dialogue and analytical methods of scholars in international relations. Feminist scholars have emerged around 1980-1990s by key figures such as Judith Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, Cynthia Cockburn and V. Spike Peterson. Since then, a lot of debate has happened and there seems to be room for more to come.

As early as 2009, scholars have been addressing the issue of cyber and womenโ€™s rights such as Gurumurthy and Menon publishing in Economic and Political Weekly already addressing โ€œViolence against Women via Cyberspace".[1]ย For this work and analysis they focus on the impact of the economy and IT sector on womenโ€™s safety by using a neo-liberalism view shifting the focus strongly towards the institutions and the factors of interdependence. Taking a neo-liberalism view into account when tackling violence against women in the cyber domain would mean that the violence should be reduced since we are all depending on said technology and would be problematic to sabotage it through using it as a medium of violence however, as one can see, the development of violence is still taking place despite the factor of having benefits. Perhaps by applyingย Keohaneโ€™s theory of monitoring, as we see with the banning of social media for youth and making deepfakes as a medium of violence illegal, one could consider analysing violence in the cyber domain from this point of view but that of course leaves room for debate.

Traditional Kenneth Waltz and other scholars are of course the foundation for the international relations and international affairs field and remain fundamental when conducting analysis. However, quite recently in the past years a shift brings about new debates on which theories and schools of thought are appropriate in the using gender in international relations which should then also be applied to addressing the issue if violence against women in the cyber domain. Prรผgl for instance critically asses the landscape of international relations theories pointing out that: โ€œWaltz suggests that treating gender as a cause of war would be reductionist because it pertains to the individual level of analysisโ€[2] On the one hand this makes sense when considering a connection between violence against women in the cyber domain and for instance current international conflicts since one wants to focus on the states however, considering the individual is also of importance since the violence is linked to the gender and is proven to continue to be so when looking at the mentioned reports by the UN. Prรผgl also points out that sociological theories in combination with constructivism provide a bridge to feminist theorizing. This would also speak for an interdisciplinary approach when tackling the issue of violence against women and especially when we consider the cyber domain since one has to combine several theories to tackle the combined matter of states, organisations, individuals, social structures and international conflicts which all play a role with violence in the cyber domain.

Photo by SCARECROW artworks on Unsplash

Sjoberg for instance points out that one cannot simply identify positivists and non-positivists when tackling gender in international relation scholarship.[3]ย ย Furthermore, Sjoberg suggests the notion that gender and international relations is โ€œat itโ€™s best when its and IR research is at its best when it is multimethod, epistemologically pluralist, multisited, and carefully navigates the differences between feminist analyses and large-n statistical studies.โ€[4]ย As the changing landscape of war and violence is moving at a rapid pace, scholars of international relations are almost โ€˜drivenโ€™ to adapt also in terms of analysing and interpreting the data. When thinking about future questions, it is beneficial to have multiple methods and keeping the different schools of thought in mind when tackling the fast-changing landscape of violence in the cyber domain however, one should also strive for a comprehensive data collection and analysis in order to make thorough conclusions. The definitions of for example violence, should be clear for all disciplines and scholars in order to be able to draw overlapping conclusions when taking different schools of thought into account.

Conclusion and what are possible future questions

The issue of violence against women physically and other forms of cyber related conflicts should not be treated as separate incidents. It may be too early to say but there seems to be a correlation between cyber related incidents and international world conflict when one sees for instance South Africa facing the โ€œhighest levels of gender-based violenceโ€ and in Arab states (such as Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan) about 60% of women face online violence.

An interdisciplinary approach by using quantitative as well as qualitative methods (which would speak for a mix of positivist and non-positivist school of thought) allows one to combine several ways in order to tackle issues such as cyber violence and extortion against women (see for instance โ€œImage-Based Sexual Baseโ€ research by Nicola Henry et al.) 

Therefore, applying international relations theories such as constructivism and feminist theories whilst of course taking the traditional way of thinking of Waltz and Clausewitz into consideration may be of use. The multi-method approach is beneficial and should be used however, with certain caution as well.  โ€œInspired by โ€œgender lensesโ€, feminist research knows security differently both in terms of where knowledge is to be found (particularly at global politicsโ€™ margins, and with/in people), what counts as knowledge (including emotion, experience, and pain), and where knowledge can be found (particularly in nontraditional formats and sources).โ€[5] Also scholars in the area of international human law are advocating for a feminist approach and speak of โ€œgendering cyberwarfareโ€.

As international conflicts are changing rapidly, speak hybrid warfare and drone incidents, states are forced to constantly adapt. The same goes for dealing with cyber related conflicts and cyber violence. When looking at women, peace and security, it is well documented that โ€˜rapeโ€™ and โ€˜violenceโ€™ against women is used as a weapon of war Perhaps one should be wary and be careful that the same will not develop in the cyber domain. One already sees an increase of women stepping back being afraid to be a target (especially those working in the public sector). Therefore, one can see great benefit in continuing the debate amongst scholars on how schools of thought can be applied, and which methodologies seem to be fitting. 

By continuing to ask questions and finding new ways to analyse the growing issue of violence against women (in the cyber domain) one can then also find possible solutions on how to achieve the end of violence against women. As can be seen from previous debates, scholars on international relations seem to be a bit โ€˜dividedโ€™ on how to implement feminist theories into the present-day international relations field. When looking at the developing issues of cyber-sex trafficking, cyber violence, grooming in the cyber domain, deepfakes, cyber espionage to name a few problems, it seems to be the case that using several methodologies and combining different theoretical ways of thinking are for now โ€˜the way to goโ€™.

[1] GURUMURTHY, ANITA, and NIVEDITHA MENON. โ€œViolence against Women via Cyberspace.โ€ Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, no. 40, 2009, pp. 19โ€“21. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663650. Accessed 27 Nov. 2025.

[2] Prรผgl, Elisabeth, โ€œGender as a cause of conflict,โ€ International Affairs 99: 5 (2023) 1885โ€“1902; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiad184

[3]ย Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship

Author(s): Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera and Cameron G. Thies

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution , April 2018, Vol. 62, No. 4 (April 2018), pp. 848-870ย 

[4]ย Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship

Author(s): Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera and Cameron G. Thies

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution , April 2018, Vol. 62, No. 4 (April 2018), pp. 848-870

[5]ย Laura Sjoberg (2024) Feminist Theories and Thinking Security Otherwise, Security Studies, 33:5, 860-884, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2024.2449334, page 874

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November 27, 2025 — No Comments

Protecting intangible Cultural Heritage: legal gaps and risks of mass violence

By Joseph Moses - Culture, Society & Security Desk


Introduction

The term โ€œdehumanizationโ€, although popular in the political lexicon, is notorious for often generating debate on its usage, rather than addressing the incidents and crimes it is supposed to aggregate and label. As it lacks a legal and fixed definition under international law, it means that a consensus can be drawn about attention to the subject only when sufficient political momentum is built up, or, in retrospect, when these activities lead to crimes labelled under international criminal law, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide.

While this article will address the relatively abstract, intangible and subjective natures of this term, it will focus more on the challenges that the implementation of international law faces regarding the destruction of intangible cultural heritage (ICH). This destruction leads to the dehumanization of certain demographic groups, placing them under the risk of ethnic cleansing and, potentially, crimes addressed under international criminal law. ICH broadly consists of customs, beliefs, traditions, languages and cultural expressions. In the investigation and proceedings related to an ongoing or past genocide, destructing of ICH (and advocating for the latter)  can be covered by the clause of intent in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Dehumanization precedes Genocide, and this often involves a long process of de-legitimization, condemnation and destruction of the targeted social groupโ€™s ICH as part of their dehumanization.

International frameworks and risk factors

The United Nations, in 2014, launched its Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes which is a tool outlining 14 risk factors to observe and analyze the risk of atrocity crimes and their preceding symptoms. While the Framework specifies that in the initial stages it is not always possible to  identify the trajectory of trends into crimes, it divides risk factors into โ€œspecific risk factorsโ€ which outline precursors to specific crimes using their legal definitions. Under the subcategories of Genocide (Risk Factor 10) and War Crimes (Risk Factor 13), it outlines in detail the application of dehumanisation trends against groups of people.

Sub-factors 10.3, 10.5 and 10.7 specify targeted systemic discriminatory practices against the lives and freedoms of a protected group, even if not reaching the level of elimination. They address the usage of methods intended to dehumanize, humiliate, or coerce and fragment the group with an intention to change the groupโ€™s identity, and declaring euphoria at the control of protected groups.

In the context of an armed conflict, sub-factors 13.4, 13.5, and 13.6 specify the promotion of ethnicity or religion as a determinant of national allegiance, the dehumanization of particular groups by exhibiting disrespect for their traditions, values, objects and institutions, and the adoption of measures that curtail the rights of protected groups who are perceived to be aligned to a hostile group.

Legal gaps and challenges in protecting intangible Cultural Heritage

It must be noted that to provide cover for discriminatory policies of exerting control over a group, states and hostile actors may also indefinitely extend the status of armed occupation or armed conflict by declaring security measures. The tool acknowledges that the intention behind these actions can often be calculated with certainty only in retrospect and that even those indicators may not be explicit. It highlights that even if uncertain, the intent to annihilate could always exist. It must be noted that while genocide and ethnic cleansing are not spontaneous acts, case law has associated intent with State or organizational policy.

The destruction and de-legitimization of ICH can take place during either peace time, periods of curfew, or active conflicts. Due to this state of definitional limbo, policies emphasizing security reasons for freedom restrictions pose a significant threat against the identity of certain groups of people, especially when they affect practices like gatherings. Re-shaping educational policy after specific narratives under the guise of de-radicalization, beyond directly targeting tangible cultural heritage as the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, describes that there is a deep-seated interdependence between ICH and tangible cultural and natural heritage, and that ICH is something that is constantly recreated and transmitted from generation to generation. Thus, beyond dehumanization, actions against ICH aim at also de-legitimizing ICH practices by breaking its continuity, hoping to expel or replace and reform the groups of people whose identity is tied to these practices.

Safeguarding cultural identity

It has been pointed out that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict is not sufficient in addressing protections for ICH. Dr. Chainoglou, associate professor at the University of Macedonia, writes that the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, together with the norms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international legal regimes, provides legal protection for intangible cultural heritage  in all phases in the event of an armed conflict. While there are legal protections during times of armed conflict, the momentum and migratory flows from conflict zones cause complications to the actual protective capability and resources at the disposal of international regimes. This  places a higher degree of onus on refugee diasporas or severely affected groups to rebuild and revive ICH (although ICH can still be continued by transforming its identity with derivations from the respective conflict itself), rather than on the aggressor upholding these protections.

Picture by MV on Pixabay

While the dehumanization also contributes to deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a group under Article II of the Genocide Convention of 1948, as precursors are often social and political and can be intentional or unintentional in their nature and conception, determining intent to commit genocide can be the most ambiguous at this stage. This further complicates the interpretation and enforcement of international law if the aggressor (State) uses the turbulence caused by declared security and reform policies, i.e., under domestically legal and bureaucratic procedures that adversely affect a groupโ€™s ICH, especially when intended to do so. The 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage provides a broad interpretation of โ€œcultural heritageโ€ but still places the onus of the protection of cultural heritage on the State against their intentional destruction. The 2003 Declaration also consolidates peacetime protections for [intangible] cultural heritage and the responsibilities of States across the entirety of international cultural heritage law applicable during peacetime. While Article VI of the Declaration covers State responsibility in the event of destruction of cultural heritage regardless of whether it is inscribed on a UNESCO or another international organizationโ€™s list, under international law, there is debate about the lack of explicitly lower thresholds of what constitutes heritage, especially when the affected and disenfranchised groups tend to have a more holistic approach to what is considered cultural heritage.

While it is no secret that the enforcement of international law is entirely subjective based on the enforcing Stateโ€™s interest, the protections afforded to ICH face significant challenges during peacetime, especially if its targeting is constantly upheld through perceived innocuous policies citing higher priority agendas such as reform and security campaigns, regardless of intent โ€“ unless the intention is explicitly stated. While a trend can be drawn retrospectively, the high threshold for what constitutes ICH and what can and must be protected by States becomes an ambiguity which can be adjusted conveniently, especially when the affected groups have a lower threshold and a higher degree of holistic approach to what they consider their ICH and its destruction. This gradual and subtle wedging and fragmenting of customs and practices (while having multiple effects on the affected groupโ€™s identity) allows political precedent to be set to trigger further cascading motions of dehumanization and disassociation of identity from the group.

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November 24, 2025 — No Comments

The end of the New START and the beginning of something new? Game-changing technologies and old strategic tensions

By Camilla Braito and Patrick Haasler - Russia Desk

Introducing the New START     

During the Cold War, nuclear arms control stood as one of the key pillars of international stability and as a guarantor of predictability in statesโ€™ behaviour. Today, that foundation is faltering. The idea of quantitatively or qualitatively reducing nuclear arsenals clashes with a growing global call to rearm, both in the nuclear field and beyond. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

Signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010 and entered into force on February 5, 2011, the New START replaced the 1991 START I, renewing both partiesโ€™ commitment to verifiably reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals. The Treaty sets three main limits. First, it caps the number of nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Second, it restricts the number of deployed delivery systems, including ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers. Third, it limits the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. Within these constraints, each side retains the freedom to structure and modernise its strategic forces at its discretion. A central feature of the New START is its monitoring and verification regime. This relies on the use of National Technical Means (NTM), a shared database updated twice a year with data on the numbers, types, and locations of Treaty-limited systems, as well as two types of on-site inspections to confirm accuracy and proper implementation. This arrangement, however, has already been on life support since 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted on-site inspections and the two signatories never agreed on their resumption. In February 2023, the situation aggravated when Russia further suspended its participation in the Treaty, citing Washingtonโ€™s hostile policy and support for Ukraine, just weeks after renewed compliance disputes.

Originally, the New START was set to last ten years, until 2021, with the option of a single five-year extension to 2026. Beyond that, no further renewals were envisioned. Within this framework, Moscowโ€™s September 22, 2025, proposal to Washington to voluntarily continue adhering to the Treatyโ€™s limits for one additional year after its expiration has particular significance. Afterย warning in July that allowing the New START to lapse would be highly undesirable, on October 5, Donald Trump responded positively to the Russian proposal, althoughย without making any formal commitment. A few days later, Vladimir Putin confirmed ongoing contacts with the U.S. through diplomatic channels, suggesting that four months should be sufficient to decide on an extension. However, he added that if the U.S. did not consider the continued adherence worthwhile, it would not be critical for Russia, whose nuclear deterrent capabilities continue to advance, most notably with the Poseidon system, a development that poses a game-changing challenge to traditional deterrence.

The delicate balance of incentives and apprehensions surrounding the Treatyโ€™s future sets the stage for exploring the motivation behind Russiaโ€™s proposal for an extension. 

Russiaโ€™s offer in context: strategic motives and technological leverage

Strategic deterrence between Russia and the U.S. has become increasingly tense following the erosion of Cold Warโ€“era nuclear arms control. Following the dissolution of the INF Treaty in 2019, both countries reintroduced intermediate-range systems to Europe, reigniting mutual suspicion. The U.S. development and potential deployment of Tomahawk and Typhon missile systems in Europe - and possibly in Ukraine - has revived Russia's long-standing fears of aย preemptiveย "decapitation strike" that could target its leadership with little warning. Moscow interprets the short flight times and high precision of these American weapons as a direct threat to its command structures, reminiscent of Soviet-era concerns during the 1980s Euromissile crisis. Washington argues that these deployments are defensive and necessary to counter Russian violations and capabilities, such as the SSC-8 missile and hypersonic systems. Nevertheless, Russiaโ€™s leadership views the situation as growing encirclement and has warned of retaliatory measures if U.S. systems move closer to its borders. This dynamic has reintroduced instability into the Europeanย theatre, with both sidesย signallingย andย counter-signallingย under the shadow of mutual deterrence. Thus, the renewed presence of American long-range missiles in Europeย symbolisesย a broader breakdown in trust and the return of Cold Warโ€“style anxieties about nuclear first strikes.

Against this tense backdrop, Russiaโ€™s revised nuclear doctrine, announced in December 2024, broadened the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be employed, including in response to an attack by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power. This is consistent with Moscowโ€™s fear of a potential U.S. transfer to Ukraine of Tomahawk missiles that can be nuclear-armed and for that are considered a direct andย destabilisingย threat, reinforcing concerns about strategic vulnerability and justifying the lowering of its nuclear threshold. The "dirty bomb" alluded to by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, which, in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, would render it impossible to differentiate between conventional and nuclear armaments, is regarded by Russia's preeminent security elites as a grave threat to Russian sovereignty. This threat is met with a range of proactive,ย preemptiveย (non-nuclear), and reactive (tactical nuclear) countermeasures.

Assuming that Russia is solely interested in a deal with the U.S. because of the perceived threat posed by the Tomahawks would once again oversimplify the issue. The following brief outline of the latest technical and military developments will substantiate the assumption that Russia is attempting to force the Americans to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Russia has recently increased its pace of development and production of the intermediate-range missileย Oreshnik, with a reported first combat use in November 2024 in the Ukrainian Oblast Dnipropetrovsk, and mass production declared in mid-2025. The system isย characterisedย as mobile, solid-fuel, capable of speeds beyond Mach 10, equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), and capable of carrying submunitions. Due to its rangeย (potentially up to 3,000โ€“5,500 km) and hypersonic speed, theย Oreshnikย missile challenges existing missileย defenceย systems and revives the risk posed by ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) since the collapse of the INF Treaty. Meanwhile, Russia claims that the nuclear-powered cruise missileย Burevestnikย (9M730) has successfully undergone very long endurance tests (14,000 km over 15 hours) and is approaching deployment. Its lower-altitude flight profile and seemingly unlimited range are designed to evade missileย defenceย systems, representing a significant shift in the design of strategic weapons. Even though substantial technical uncertainty remains, particularly regarding the nuclear reactor propulsion unit, post-flight guidance, and operational safety, it can be expected that the missile will undergo further technical improvement and is therefore seen by many experts as a potential game-changer that could put the United States under immense pressure.ย 

Another strand of novel Russian strategic capability is represented by the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (nuclear-powered torpedo), which is designed to travel long distances underwater, carry a high-yield thermonuclear charge, and threaten coastal infrastructure and naval bases. Due to the extensive nature of U.S. coastal and marine infrastructure, some analysts describe Poseidon as a "strategy-changer" in the maritime nuclear domain. These systems are important because they have the potential to degrade existing U.S./NATO missileย defenceย and deterrence architectures, and they signal Russian strategic resolve. By introducing weapons that evade or challenge existingย defenceย layers, Russia aims to tip the scales of nuclear and conventional deterrence in itsย favourย and signal a determined position of strength on a tactical and strategic level. The U.S., so far, is lacking equivalent public breakthroughs. Russia's recent tests of theย Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and Poseidon underwater drone are portrayed as revolutionary, providing unlimited range and the ability to loiter indefinitely, thus ensuring strategic parity for the entire 21st century. These systems are said to blur traditional missile categories, making them nearly impossible to verify or limit under existing arms control frameworks. Overall, the absence of reciprocal control mechanisms and growing distrust could fuel an uncontrolled arms race and heighten global nuclear danger.

All these things considered, it can be argued that Russia is leveraging technological innovation not merely as a means of deterrence but as a political instrument to restore strategic balance and compel renewed engagement from Washington. The shift from perceived vulnerability to technological assertiveness forms the backdrop for Russiaโ€™s new weapons programs and its current approach to arms control negotiations.

What comes next for the New START?     

Three possible scenarios on the New START could unfold after February 5, 2026. In the first, Moscow confirms the proposed commitment, and Washington agrees to reciprocate, allowing both parties to continue voluntarily observing the Treatyโ€™s quantitative limits for one more year, notwithstanding other major divergences, mainly on the war in Ukraine. In the second, the Treaty expires without any time-bound effort to uphold its provisions, and in the absence of a successor arms control arrangement, the two largest nuclear arsenals may go unconstrainedย for the first time in more than three decades. In the third scenario, negotiations begin on a new agreement addressing strategic nuclear arsenals, either bilaterally or with China involved, at least in the early stages. Indeed, Chinaโ€™s growing capabilities provide strategic cover for Russia and reduce the leverage of traditional U.S.โ€“Russia arms control, highlighting the need for a multilateral framework. This final scenario could develop independently or alongside one of the previous two, provided there is sufficient political will to initiate sustained talks. As both parties remain preoccupied with other urgent matters, it is unlikely that such an initiative will advance on its own; rather, it would likely progress in parallel with either an extension or the definitive termination of the existing Treaty.ย 

This range of possible outcomes sheds light on how the trajectory of the New START reflects the state of U.S.โ€“Russia relations, the impasse in Ukraine, and the broader decline in genuine commitment to non-proliferation goals.

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Conclusion                      

As things stand, the New START remains the only existing nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. When it expires in 2026, there will be no formal, legally binding limits on strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades. Since a further formal renewal is not permitted under its current terms, serious concerns about the future of global arms control and strategic stability arise.ย 

Russia seeks to extend or replace the New START from a perceived position of strength, leveraging its recent breakthroughs in novel strategic weapons to force the United States back to the negotiating table, preferably on Moscowโ€™s terms. These systems are designed to bypass or overwhelm U.S. missile defences, restore strategic parity after the INF Treatyโ€™s collapse, and counter perceived encirclement by NATO, particularly the potential deployment of nuclear-capable Tomahawk missiles in Europe or Ukraine. By showcasing technically advanced, hard-to-intercept delivery vehicles and broadening its nuclear doctrine, Moscow aims to deter further Western escalation while signalling that any future arms-control agreement must account for these game-changing capabilities and address Russiaโ€™s core security concerns.

More than ever, the not-so-distant prospect of the New START reaching the end of its validity highlights the enduring importance of nuclear arms control for global security. Arms control embodies a paradoxical form of partnership, one in which rivals cooperate to co-manage deterrence and reduce the risks inherent in their competition. In essence, such agreements serve to uphold strategic stability, preserve crisis stability, and prevent the escalation of arms races, reminding us that even limited and imperfect cooperation is preferable to the absence of any attempt at regulation and that the willingness of states to negotiate in bona fide is a precondition for arms control efforts to work out. 

It remains incumbent on the American and Russian leadership to balance technological advancement with diplomatic engagement, seeking paths to stabilise deterrence beyond mere temporary extensions. The coming months are crucial for shaping the future of nuclear arms control and reducing strategic risks in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.

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November 12, 2025 — No Comments

Energy security and regional interdependence: can South Asia collaborate?

By Arslan Sheikh - South Asia Desk

The growing population and economies of South Asia are crucially dependent on its rivers and lands. Major rivers like Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus are the main sources of agriculture, energy, and livelihood. The region inhabits about a quarter of the world's population but only around four percent of its renewable waters. Global Environmental Change (GEC) is exacerbating glacial melt and shifting monsoon patterns causing extreme frequent floods and droughts. In terms of energy, South Asia is facing chronic deficiency - infrastructure strain and fuel import dependence have led many areas without reliable power. Experts argue that without new and efficient sources of energy which is causing โ€œenergy and power shortagesโ€, could lead to crises. Altogether, these strains on water, food, and energy, accentuates urgent need for coordinated policies.

The Water-Energy-Food Nexus in South Asia

Water produces energy and is crucial for agriculture which provides food. Water management is โ€œundoubtedly complex and interlinked with other significant challenges, including energy and food security, [and] agricultural productionโ€. Agriculture uses most of South Asiaโ€™s freshwater and its farmers are heavily dependent on groundwater for irrigation. The tubewells/pumps used for the irrigation are run by diesel or electricity, which means energy shortfalls or high costs would adversely impact food production. Reciprocally, thermal power plants need high volumes of water for cooling, so water scarcity can also put strain on energy output. On the other hand, hydropower depends on rivers that also irrigate agricultural lands. In sum, activities in one sector often popple across other sectors. Integrated and coordinated approaches are therefore important for planning.

The stress due to GEC intensifies these interlinked water-food-energy nexus. Glacial melt and extreme droughts may lead to pumping of more groundwater, increasing demands for energy and depleting aquifers. Moreover, extreme droughts or floods can sever power generation. In the absence of cross-sectoral planning, South Asian countries are risking the opportunity to solve one problem, only to worsen another. In view of this, analysts argue that any policies for South Asian โ€œdevelopmentโ€ must take into account these interdependencies.

Transboundary Water Management

Majority of South Asiaโ€™s waters come from the high Himalayas - highlighting the transnational character of these waters. These basins flow across multiple countries, yet formal cooperation is very limited and narrow in scope. No region-wide institution is in place to manage these shared basins with the exception of a few bilateral treaties that cover dozens of cross-boundary rivers. For example, India and Bangladesh, which share fifty-four rivers, have a Joint Rivers Commission and a 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty. India and Pakistan have the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 - but currently in abeyance. India also has a 1996 Mahakali Treaty with Nepal as well as multiple powersharing agreements with Bhutan. Despite these limited agreements, there is no comprehensive cooperative framework among all riparians, majority of whose headwaters originate in China.

This assortment of water sharing is not sufficient in times of growing demands. Urbanizations and agricultural expansion are exploiting rivers and groundwater unsustainably, putting the region under water stress unless there is any improvement in management. Yet national policies are centred around short-term un-sustainable developmental goals without any consideration of its cross-sectoral and cross-boundary impacts. In these crucial times, countries prioritizing zero-sum games and competition over collaboration highlight how much they are worried about human and environmental security instead of national - ironically achieving neither.

Building of trust among South Asian countries is a constant challenge because of factors not limited to historical rivalries and concerns - which has led to minimal transparency and sharing of crucial environmental data. Increased data sharing and transparency are critical for riparian countries to negotiate equal and sustainable usage of waters. If the riparian countries of South Asia seek shared water security, cooperation over conflict offers a good chance for equitable and sustainable management.

Regional Energy Integration

South Asian countries are exploring cross-border trade of power to fill energy gaps. A World Bank researcher argues that in case of a unified South Asian regional โ€œmarketโ€, untapped hydro resources could nearly double its generation capacity, and adding a moderate carbon tax could raise hydropower output by roughly 2.7 times over two decades. Another analysis highlights that electricity sharing would let South Asian countries exploit complementarities - for example, distribution of surplus peak to deficit area.

Some regional approaches are in process of materializing. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal are discussing grid connections and energy corridors. For example, plans for an Easter Waterways Grid proposes linking river ports and transmission lines between India and Bangladesh, also connecting Bhutan and Nepal to facilitate trade. This initiative is projected to benefit some six-hundred million people across the sub-region. India has already positioned itself as a power-trade hub - it exports power to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal, while importing from Bhutan and Nepal. These examples are early steps toward a limited integrated system. If expanded to all South Asian countries, such trading would allow surplus power to flow in deficit regions, smoothing out fluctuations and lowering costs. Achieving sustainable energy security in South Asia is only possible through regional collaboration.

Agriculture, Food Security, Energy

Agriculture is the biggest provider of employment and food security in South Asia. It needs both water and energy, not only for irrigation but also for fertilisation, mechanisation, and post-harvest cold storage. Irrigation uses majority of freshwater in some areas. This means that any shortage in water or power can directly impact the crop production and harvests. Ignoring these linkages could backfire and undermine both food and energy security of the region.

Photo by Tanha Tamanna Syed (Pexel).

As of 2021, nearly eight percent of the people in region lack access to reliable grid-based electricity, an forty-seven percent remain inaccessible to clean cooking fuels and technologies. In addition to this, the existing inefficiencies of the system has given rise to a three-fold challenge - โ€œenergy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainabilityโ€.

GEC-led variability adds complex challenges to the food production. The changing monsoon patterns and decreasing glacial melt in late summer can leave fields parched at important times. Simultaneously, increase in the occurrence of frequent floods are damaging crops and land. A cooperative regional approach could help reducing these risks. For example, sharing efficient practices in irrigation or rural electrification would yield benefits. Coordinated flood forecasting and storage-release policies could improve water use across borders to protect food and power systems.

Conclusion

The potential benefits of collaboration is enormous. For example, the increase in hydropower generation through regional markets could replace the need for expensive fuel-import, reducing carbon emissions and energy costs. An efficient, coordinated, and equitable water management could protect agriculture and industry from instability. The increase in transboundary power trade could also secure energy. Shared infrastructure could improve disaster resilience. Though this article may seem pointing towards a more ideal scenarios, but acknowledging the geopolitical barriers, water-food-energy nexus itself leaves no choice but to accept the fact that share challenges need shared solutions.

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November 11, 2025 — No Comments

Is the EUโ€™s fragmented political will weakening its actorness?

By Leif Niendorf and Eline Stensen Gulliksen - UK & European Affairs Desk


Has the European Union aimed too high in trying to establish itself as a multi-dimensional power? And is it a weakening project? As the EU is being put to the test by Donald Trumpโ€™s re-election and a war on the European continent, its identity has once again become a subject of debate. Created as an economic union after World War II, the EU has expanded its power beyond the purely economic sphere, driven by integration and path dependency, into a comprehensive political union with growing militaryย capabilities.


The EU wields multi-dimensional power, manifesting as a normative power, market power, and, notably, an emerging realist power that is currently a significant topic of discussion in Europe. The Unionโ€™s economic power is substantial and is often used to pursue policy goals; it uses its market power as โ€œcarrots and sticksโ€ to influence countries to comply; hence, the EUโ€™s market power can be a tool for achieving normative goals. However, what happens when the two perceptions of the Unionโ€™s identity clash, and the EU must choose between them? What identity wins, and what is the main factor that shapes EU foreign policy?


Having started as a peace project and as an advocate of the rule of law, human rights, and liberal values in Europe and worldwide, it makes only sense that the EU also seeks to maintain its position as a normative power. Since the early 2000s, the EU has also opened increasingly loud debates about its capacities in the realms of security and defence, culminating in the establishment of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). However, it can be argued that ever since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trumpโ€™s re-appropriation of power in the US, traditionally the primary provider of military security for many EU members, it was no longer a mere desire, but an actual necessity to become a realist power as well.


Now, the EU finds itself stuck in a complex situation: it is a market power, wants to be a normative power, and needs to become a realist power. In reality, due to serious inherent obstacles, it is highly challenging to fulfil a credible role across all these interlinked dimensions of power simultaneously.


Not only are there different pledges of allegiance to NATO, strategic cultures, and threat perceptions within the EU, all of which are long-known impediments to the EU as a unified realist power alongside domestic politics, but different foreign policy approaches nowadays even actively undermine the EU's efforts to be recognised as such. The most apparent is this in differing stances on sanctions and weapons deliveries in the context of Russiaโ€™s aggression against Ukraine.


As a realist power, the EU pushes to support Ukraine with military equipment (partly also to sustain its values, thus holding up the flag as a normative power, indicating how intertwined the realms really are), yet Hungary, as the prime example, vetoes such decisions regularly. Simultaneously, Hungary is put under pressure by the EU for its rule of law violations. The situation illustrates the difficulty: Firstly, it underscores the inability of the EU to speak with one voice as a realist power. Secondly, and maybe even more dramatically, it undermines its assumed role as a normative power when Hungary uses its veto to pressure the EU โ€”for example, in the context of funding held back due to the transgression of EU values โ€”and succeeds. If the EU needs to grant exceptions in the normative realm to pursue goals in the realist realm, an inextricable dilemma emerges, where it canโ€™t be both a full normative and a realist power at the same time. In the case of sanctions, a realist tool that market powers can apply, the situation is similar. With Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia and the recent electoral success of Andre Babiลก in the Czech Republic, the number of EU members inclined to torpedo harsh measures on Russia has risen.

Source: illustration generated using OpenAI for visualisation purposes.

Notwithstanding, even outside Eastern and Central Europe, some instances can potentially hamper the EUโ€™s triad of being a market, normative and realist power all at once. For example, did Belgium veto the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine due to large parts of these currently being custodied in the country? Moreover, Spainโ€™s reluctance to raise its defence budget significantly, as demanded by its allies, given its location far from Europeโ€™s frontlines and strategically contested areas, shows that the perception of urgency is not necessarily equally distributed across Union members.

The picture of the EUโ€™s power is confused in a time that calls for unity and stringent action. How unhandy it comes in presently; at large, it alludes to the complexity that the EU, as an object โ€œsui generisโ€ and with all its heterogeneity, has always lived with. These current, challenging times will therefore be a real test of the extent to which the EU can be a plausible power beyond markets. 

The EUโ€™s evolution into a multi-faceted power highlights both its aspirations and inherent contradictions. Though it seeks to promote normative values worldwide, the situation in Hungary underscores the limitations of these ideals when confronted with complex political and economic realities. Amid the current geopolitical landscapeโ€”characterised by Trumpโ€™s re-election and a nearby conflictโ€”the EU faces a significant identity crisis. Pressures for defence integration and strategic autonomy intensify, but they encounter institutional blockages and varying national priorities.


To exceed its role as merely an economic powerhouse with fragmented political will, it must align its values with its actions and move beyond half-measures. The Union is now at a pivotal point: it can either establish itself as a unified strategic actor or remain a more economically motivated Union with political ambitions. The next few months will reveal whether the notion of being โ€œstronger togetherโ€ is a genuine commitment or merely a catchphrase.

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November 7, 2025 — No Comments

The Diplomatic Overreach of Donald Trump

By Anurag Mishra and Pedro Mendes - US desk

Non-interventionism is generally regarded and commonly understood as a foreign policy of political or military non-involvement in the foreign relations or internal affairs of other countries. The United Nations makes the observance of the principle incumbent upon member states by including it in the UN Charter under Article 2.4. Nevertheless, in Morgenthaun's imagination, bigger states arm-twisting or even dominating the external and internal affairs of smaller states is rather unexceptional. The Banana Republic phenomenon may have become an old clichรฉ, yet it remains a metaphorical reality in the present day. In contrast to small, powerless states being dictated by superpowers, there are also instances of more robust and formidable countries having to navigate a more powerful and demanding ally. This diplomatic overreach differs from direct threats or confrontations with adversaries; instead, it involves unsolicited initiatives that may carry consequences.

The rise of Donald Trump to the presidency and the range of diplomatic strategies he employed present a notable example of diplomatic overreach, or, if we may say so, interventionism by other means. Whether this on-camera diplomacy by Donald Trump is a calculated maneuver or simply part of his unconventional approach remains to be studied.

Cases in Point

Alluding to Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and his work, albeit through a different lens than wartime scenarios vis-ร -vis the current context, it is possible to parallel a conceptual imperial presidency that leads to diplomatic overreach. We can observe similarities in the growing presidential primacy in foreign policy, concurrently with the use of unilateral tools, such as cutting foreign aid, exiting international organisations, issuing tariffs, and a considerable number of executive orders.

Under the constant framing of a looming threat, be it economic, migrant related, whether foreign or domestic, this narrative paves the way for this unilateral strategy. Bolstered by the placement of loyalists in institutions, such as the Foreign Service, this executive unilateralism fuels diplomatic overreach such as signaling Canada to become a US state. This example erodes the trust between allies, heightening tariff tensions between the two and giving the impression to other countries that the US may view friendly states as subordinate, reducing its credibility as a partner that respects sovereignty, and further raising security concerns and public perception issues.

This diplomatic overreach can again be exemplified in Trumpโ€™s call for the release of Bolsonaro. Trumpโ€™s public support for Bolsonaroโ€™s release could influence Brazilโ€™s international alignments, including its engagement with BRICS. This raises questions about respect for national sovereignty and undermines the US position when it later invokes non-interference or the rule of law.

Again, the call to the President of Israel to pardon Netanyahu can be viewed as a challenge to Israelโ€™s judicial independence and sovereignty, weakening the alliance between the two. It can strengthen domestic opposition by showing Netanyahu as reliant on foreign assistance. Even if the narrative of โ€œsaving Israelโ€ serves Netanyahu and the US geopolitical interests in the short term, it highlights Trumpโ€™s diplomatic overreach.

Picture: President Donald J. Trump and Vice President Mike Pence participate in an expanded bilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Monday, Jan. 27, 2020, in the Oval Office of the White House. (Official White House Photo by D. Myles Cullen)

Interventionism V. Diplomacy

In international relations, interventionism refers to the intentional involvement of one state in the internal or external affairs of another, whether through military invasion, economic coercion, or political manipulation, to promote security, values, or influence. Powerful states often use interventionist strategies to secure zones of influence and proactively shape global outcomes. The creation of buffer states, client states, and banana republics exemplifies how interventionism operates beyond overt military force. A buffer state serves as a geopolitical buffer between rival powers; a client state functions under the economic or military dominance of a patron; and the term โ€œbanana republicโ€ describes countries whose economic and political systems are subordinated to foreign strategic or business interests, often accompanied by interventionism.


By contrast, diplomacy ostensibly uses negotiation, persuasion, and representation rather than coercion. However, diplomacy itself harbors a covert element, namely, intelligence gathering, back-channel negotiations, and subtle influence campaigns, which buttress the art of statecraft.

In recent years, Trumpโ€™s foreign policy has illustrated how interventionism and diplomacy merge on the spectrum of influence, giving birth to a lesser-seen phenomenon of โ€œOvert Diplomacyโ€ or โ€œInterference, not Interventionโ€. Interestingly, the countries on the receiving end of Trumpโ€™s interference arenโ€™t meek bananas or clients, but powerful countries and formidable allies.

President Trumpโ€™s attempts in Brazil, where he publicly defended former President Jair Bolsonaro, threatened 50 % tariffs on Brazilian goods if legal proceedings continued, and in Israel, where he intervened in the legal process of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by publicly calling for his corruption trial to be canceled or pardoned, and reversing sanctions on Israeli settler groups, moves that have been interpreted by some observers undermining judicial independence, put across a rarely seen act of public and overt diplomacy. The reason the American president has chosen to conduct his business in public view is that this unique brand of diplomacy appears to serve both domestic and international political purposes. Such public interventions allow him to project strength, command global attention, and consolidate internal support, even when legal or normative costs mount.

Picture: (Washington, DC - EUA 19/03/2019) Presidente da Repรบblica Jair Bolsonaro responde perguntas da imprensa durante o encontro. Foto: Isac Nรณbrega/PR

Conclusion

The Trumpian model of โ€œOvert Diplomacyโ€ evidenced interesting aspects, merging both appeal and coercion. Usually shielded from public displays, these attempts at interference reverse that trend and have both domestic and foreign consequences, conveying the image of assertive leadership. Aimed not at rivals, but at traditional allies, it walks a fine line, risking old alliances while balancing them with short-term political gains. However, the consequences of this trade-off remain uncertain.ย 

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