By Giovanni Giacalone - Central and South America Desk
On October 24, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasuryโs Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the President of Colombia Gustavo Petro, his wife, his son, and Petroโs close associate, Armando Benedetti, over accusations of involvement in the global drug trade.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement. โPetro has allowed drug cartels to flourish and refused to stop this activityโฆPresident Trump is taking strong action to protect our nation and make clear that we will not tolerate the trafficking of drugs into our nation.โ
Following the sanctions announcement, Petro named an attorney and stated that he will battle the measure taken by Washington. The Colombian President also praised his approach to countering narcotics: โCombating drug trafficking effectively for decades brings me this measure from the government of the society we helped so much to stop its use of cocaineโฆQuite a paradox, but not one step back and never on our knees.โ
In September, the United States added Colombia to a list of countries failing to cooperate in the war on drugs, for the first time since the Pablo Escobar era.
Gustavo Petro, a former far-left guerrilla leader, claims that his counter-narcotics policy is utilizing a non-repressive approach that prioritises reaching agreements with coca leaf farmers in order to convince them to cultivate other types of crops while, at the same time, using law enforcement to hunt down drug dealers.
However, according to UN data from the Office on Drugs and Crime, the amount of land dedicated to coca cultivation has almost tripled in the past decade to a record 253,000 hectares (625,000 acres) in 2023. Colombia provides around 90% of the cocaine that is sold every year in the U.S.
The Cartel de los Soles
While the Colombian President is accused of failing to cooperate in the drug war, with Colombia being the primary cocaine provider, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and his close associates are accused by the U.S. of leading the drug distribution network through the Cartel de los Soles, transporting the merchandise to Mexico, the final distributor.
In July 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Maduro (indicated as the leader of the Cartel), Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez, and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello Rondon. Other senior regime figures had already been blacklisted in 2020. President Trump has also placed a bounty on Maduroโs head, offering $US50 million for information leading to his arrest.
A drug trafficking organisation formed by high-ranking members of the Venezuelan state and armed forces, the Cartel de los Soles emerged in 1993, when two National Guard generals were investigated for drug trafficking. As brigade commanders, they wore a sun as their insignia, hence the name "Cartel de los Soles." Initially, the group was called "Grupo Fenix," and consisted primarily of majors, colonels, and lower-ranking military personnel. Over time, however, senior officers began to enter the fray, taking control of the trafficking ring and eliminating the lower ranks. The Cartel de los Soles was designated by the Trump administration as a โForeign Terrorist Organisationโ in November 2025.
The weak Petro-Maduro political alliance
In August 2025, after the sanctions imposed by Washington on Maduro and his associates, Colombian President Gustavo Petro expressed his support for the Venezuelan leader, claiming that โColombia and Venezuela are the same people, the same flag, the same historyโ and that โany military operation that is not approved by our sister countries is an aggression against Latin America and the Caribbean.โ Petro also referred to Simon Bolivarโs call โfreedom or death,โ further revealing his attempt to bring Colombia closer to Venezuela.
Since being elected president of Colombia in August 2022, Gustavo Petro has gradually sought to distance the country from Western alliances and position himself alongside Maduro and the Bolivarian Alliance. This shift is unsurprising given his past as a member of the M-19, a far-left armed group founded in the 1970s and inspired by the Uruguayan Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros. At its height in the mid-1980s, the M-19 was the second largest armed group in Colombia, after the FARC, with the number of active members estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000. The M-19 demobilised in the late 1980s and transitioned to electoral politics.
Former Colombian Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon recently urged the U.S Presidency not to cut off all counter-narcotics aid to Colombia and hike tariffs, because this would affect the Colombian population as well as the military and law enforcement still operating on the frontline against narco-terrorism.
Pinzon instead suggested implementing sanctions against specific individuals who work in support of drug trafficking. This was done a few days later with the sanctions against Petro.
Pinzon was correct in that the situations in Colombia and Venezuela are extremely different and cannot be addressed with the same approach.
Venezuela has been a Bolivarian stronghold for decades, first under Chรกvez and then under Maduro. U.S. authorities contend that Venezuela has taken on a larger role in regional drug trafficking and has strengthened its ties with Iran, developments that have contributing to instability in the region. Under Maduro, Hezbollah's presence has proliferated in the country, becoming the main launching pad for drug trafficking to the United States.
Colombia, for its part, has always been a staunch ally of Washington, both in the fight against drug trafficking and against terrorism. The Colombian armed forces are trained by the United States and have been working together since the war against the Medellรญn and Cali cartels in the 1990s.
In 2022, Gustavo Petro was elected president, but despite his efforts, he was unable to separate the country's institutions from Washington. It's no coincidence that during the recent attempted attack by far-left protesters on the US Embassy in Bogotรก, Petro had no choice but to deploy riot police to repel the attack, drawing criticism from his own supporters.
Critics argue that Petroโs government could face increasing internal challenges, and sanctions will certainly help. As for Maduro, however, some debate whether increased U.S. engagement may be required in the future, assuming Trump doesn't change his mind at the last minute.
The United States has deployed a massive military force of approximately 10,000 U.S. soldiers, most of them at bases in Puerto Rico, but also a contingent of Marines on amphibious assault ships, as well as F-35 fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, eight warships, and a submarine.
US navy ships and aircrafts have been sighted just a few hundreds of miles off the coast of Venezuela, while the US has been conducting raids against more narco-speed boats leaving the coasts of Colombia and Venezuela.
Moreover, the US Navy announced the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, Americaโs largest warship, had arrived in the US Southern Command area of operations after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Ford to head to the Caribbean from Europe in late October.
On the other side, this past week, Venezuela has announced a large-scale mobilisation of troops, weapons, and equipment in response to what it calls a growing U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Sea. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez said land, air, naval, and reserve forces will conduct exercises through Wednesday, describing the operation as a response to what he termed the โimperialist threatโ posed by the United States. The maneuvers will also include participation from the Bolivarian militia, a civilian reserve force aligned with the Maduro regime.
Whether all this mobilisation by the US serves merely to pressure the leader to resign peacefully or is instead instrumental in a regime change operation is another matter.
A full-scale U.S. invasion akin to the 1989 operation in Panama is highly improbable given Venezuelaโs circumstances. The countryโs vast size and complex geography, characterised by mountainous regions and dense jungle, provide ideal conditions for prolonged guerrilla warfare. Moreover, Venezuelaโs armed forces are significantly more organised and capable than Panamaโs were at the time. In addition, the Trump administration has shown little inclination to initiate new military conflicts.
A more plausible scenario for U.S. involvement might involve indirect support for a domestic uprising against the current regime, potentially through covert operations led by the Central Intelligence Agency, which may or may not already be active within Venezuelan territory.
The data is essential when one also thinks about what methods and schools of thought can be applied from international relations in order to analyse these trends. Many factors play a role when tackling this issue such as international conflicts, socio-economic factors and political aspects. How are schools of thought such as realism, constructivism, feminism and liberalism placed? Is there a connection? This article aims to analyse this and suggest possible future questions that need to be asked.
Schools of thought surrounding gender and international relationsย
In International relations as well as international affairs once has the main theoretical pillars: realism, liberalism and constructivism. These have been shaping the debates, dialogue and analytical methods of scholars in international relations. Feminist scholars have emerged around 1980-1990s by key figures such as Judith Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, Cynthia Cockburn and V. Spike Peterson. Since then, a lot of debate has happened and there seems to be room for more to come.
As early as 2009, scholars have been addressing the issue of cyber and womenโs rights such as Gurumurthy and Menon publishing in Economic and Political Weekly already addressing โViolence against Women via Cyberspace".[1]ย For this work and analysis they focus on the impact of the economy and IT sector on womenโs safety by using a neo-liberalism view shifting the focus strongly towards the institutions and the factors of interdependence. Taking a neo-liberalism view into account when tackling violence against women in the cyber domain would mean that the violence should be reduced since we are all depending on said technology and would be problematic to sabotage it through using it as a medium of violence however, as one can see, the development of violence is still taking place despite the factor of having benefits. Perhaps by applyingย Keohaneโs theory of monitoring, as we see with the banning of social media for youth and making deepfakes as a medium of violence illegal, one could consider analysing violence in the cyber domain from this point of view but that of course leaves room for debate.
Traditional Kenneth Waltz and other scholars are of course the foundation for the international relations and international affairs field and remain fundamental when conducting analysis. However, quite recently in the past years a shift brings about new debates on which theories and schools of thought are appropriate in the using gender in international relations which should then also be applied to addressing the issue if violence against women in the cyber domain. Prรผgl for instance critically asses the landscape of international relations theories pointing out that: โWaltz suggests that treating gender as a cause of war would be reductionist because it pertains to the individual level of analysisโ[2] On the one hand this makes sense when considering a connection between violence against women in the cyber domain and for instance current international conflicts since one wants to focus on the states however, considering the individual is also of importance since the violence is linked to the gender and is proven to continue to be so when looking at the mentioned reports by the UN. Prรผgl also points out that sociological theories in combination with constructivism provide a bridge to feminist theorizing. This would also speak for an interdisciplinary approach when tackling the issue of violence against women and especially when we consider the cyber domain since one has to combine several theories to tackle the combined matter of states, organisations, individuals, social structures and international conflicts which all play a role with violence in the cyber domain.
Sjoberg for instance points out that one cannot simply identify positivists and non-positivists when tackling gender in international relation scholarship.[3]ย ย Furthermore, Sjoberg suggests the notion that gender and international relations is โat itโs best when its and IR research is at its best when it is multimethod, epistemologically pluralist, multisited, and carefully navigates the differences between feminist analyses and large-n statistical studies.โ[4]ย As the changing landscape of war and violence is moving at a rapid pace, scholars of international relations are almost โdrivenโ to adapt also in terms of analysing and interpreting the data. When thinking about future questions, it is beneficial to have multiple methods and keeping the different schools of thought in mind when tackling the fast-changing landscape of violence in the cyber domain however, one should also strive for a comprehensive data collection and analysis in order to make thorough conclusions. The definitions of for example violence, should be clear for all disciplines and scholars in order to be able to draw overlapping conclusions when taking different schools of thought into account.
Conclusion and what are possible future questions
The issue of violence against women physically and other forms of cyber related conflicts should not be treated as separate incidents. It may be too early to say but there seems to be a correlation between cyber related incidents and international world conflict when one sees for instance South Africa facing the โhighest levels of gender-based violenceโ and in Arab states (such as Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan) about 60% of women face online violence.
An interdisciplinary approach by using quantitative as well as qualitative methods (which would speak for a mix of positivist and non-positivist school of thought) allows one to combine several ways in order to tackle issues such as cyber violence and extortion against women (see for instance โImage-Based Sexual Baseโ research by Nicola Henry et al.)
Therefore, applying international relations theories such as constructivism and feminist theories whilst of course taking the traditional way of thinking of Waltz and Clausewitz into consideration may be of use. The multi-method approach is beneficial and should be used however, with certain caution as well. โInspired by โgender lensesโ, feminist research knows security differently both in terms of where knowledge is to be found (particularly at global politicsโ margins, and with/in people), what counts as knowledge (including emotion, experience, and pain), and where knowledge can be found (particularly in nontraditional formats and sources).โ[5] Also scholars in the area of international human law are advocating for a feminist approach and speak of โgendering cyberwarfareโ.
As international conflicts are changing rapidly, speak hybrid warfare and drone incidents, states are forced to constantly adapt. The same goes for dealing with cyber related conflicts and cyber violence. When looking at women, peace and security, it is well documented that โrapeโ and โviolenceโ against women is used as a weapon of war Perhaps one should be wary and be careful that the same will not develop in the cyber domain. One already sees an increase of women stepping back being afraid to be a target (especially those working in the public sector). Therefore, one can see great benefit in continuing the debate amongst scholars on how schools of thought can be applied, and which methodologies seem to be fitting.
By continuing to ask questions and finding new ways to analyse the growing issue of violence against women (in the cyber domain) one can then also find possible solutions on how to achieve the end of violence against women. As can be seen from previous debates, scholars on international relations seem to be a bit โdividedโ on how to implement feminist theories into the present-day international relations field. When looking at the developing issues of cyber-sex trafficking, cyber violence, grooming in the cyber domain, deepfakes, cyber espionage to name a few problems, it seems to be the case that using several methodologies and combining different theoretical ways of thinking are for now โthe way to goโ.
[1] GURUMURTHY, ANITA, and NIVEDITHA MENON. โViolence against Women via Cyberspace.โ Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, no. 40, 2009, pp. 19โ21. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663650. Accessed 27 Nov. 2025.
[2] Prรผgl, Elisabeth, โGender as a cause of conflict,โ International Affairs 99: 5 (2023) 1885โ1902; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiad184
By Joseph Moses - Culture, Society & Security Desk
Introduction
The term โdehumanizationโ, although popular in the political lexicon, is notorious for often generating debate on its usage, rather than addressing the incidents and crimes it is supposed to aggregate and label. As it lacks a legal and fixed definition under international law, it means that a consensus can be drawn about attention to the subject only when sufficient political momentum is built up, or, in retrospect, when these activities lead to crimes labelled under international criminal law, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide.
While this article will address the relatively abstract, intangible and subjective natures of this term, it will focus more on the challenges that the implementation of international law faces regarding the destruction of intangible cultural heritage (ICH). This destruction leads to the dehumanization of certain demographic groups, placing them under the risk of ethnic cleansing and, potentially, crimes addressed under international criminal law. ICH broadly consists of customs, beliefs, traditions, languages and cultural expressions. In the investigation and proceedings related to an ongoing or past genocide, destructing of ICH (and advocating for the latter) can be covered by the clause of intent in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Dehumanization precedes Genocide, and this often involves a long process of de-legitimization, condemnation and destruction of the targeted social groupโs ICH as part of their dehumanization.
International frameworks and risk factors
The United Nations, in 2014, launched its Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes which is a tool outlining 14 risk factors to observe and analyze the risk of atrocity crimes and their preceding symptoms. While the Framework specifies that in the initial stages it is not always possible to identify the trajectory of trends into crimes, it divides risk factors into โspecific risk factorsโ which outline precursors to specific crimes using their legal definitions. Under the subcategories of Genocide (Risk Factor 10) and War Crimes (Risk Factor 13), it outlines in detail the application of dehumanisation trends against groups of people.
Sub-factors 10.3, 10.5 and 10.7 specify targeted systemic discriminatory practices against the lives and freedoms of a protected group, even if not reaching the level of elimination. They address the usage of methods intended to dehumanize, humiliate, or coerce and fragment the group with an intention to change the groupโs identity, and declaring euphoria at the control of protected groups.
In the context of an armed conflict, sub-factors 13.4, 13.5, and 13.6 specify the promotion of ethnicity or religion as a determinant of national allegiance, the dehumanization of particular groups by exhibiting disrespect for their traditions, values, objects and institutions, and the adoption of measures that curtail the rights of protected groups who are perceived to be aligned to a hostile group.
Legal gaps and challenges in protecting intangible Cultural Heritage
It must be noted that to provide cover for discriminatory policies of exerting control over a group, states and hostile actors may also indefinitely extend the status of armed occupation or armed conflict by declaring security measures. The tool acknowledges that the intention behind these actions can often be calculated with certainty only in retrospect and that even those indicators may not be explicit. It highlights that even if uncertain, the intent to annihilate could always exist. It must be noted that while genocide and ethnic cleansing are not spontaneous acts, case law has associated intent with State or organizational policy.
The destruction and de-legitimization of ICH can take place during either peace time, periods of curfew, or active conflicts. Due to this state of definitional limbo, policies emphasizing security reasons for freedom restrictions pose a significant threat against the identity of certain groups of people, especially when they affect practices like gatherings. Re-shaping educational policy after specific narratives under the guise of de-radicalization, beyond directly targeting tangible cultural heritage as the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, describes that there is a deep-seated interdependence between ICH and tangible cultural and natural heritage, and that ICH is something that is constantly recreated and transmitted from generation to generation. Thus, beyond dehumanization, actions against ICH aim at also de-legitimizing ICH practices by breaking its continuity, hoping to expel or replace and reform the groups of people whose identity is tied to these practices.
Safeguarding cultural identity
It has been pointed out that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict is not sufficient in addressing protections for ICH. Dr. Chainoglou, associate professor at the University of Macedonia, writes that the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, together with the norms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international legal regimes, provides legal protection for intangible cultural heritage in all phases in the event of an armed conflict. While there are legal protections during times of armed conflict, the momentum and migratory flows from conflict zones cause complications to the actual protective capability and resources at the disposal of international regimes. This places a higher degree of onus on refugee diasporas or severely affected groups to rebuild and revive ICH (although ICH can still be continued by transforming its identity with derivations from the respective conflict itself), rather than on the aggressor upholding these protections.
While the dehumanization also contributes to deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a group under Article II of the Genocide Convention of 1948, as precursors are often social and political and can be intentional or unintentional in their nature and conception, determining intent to commit genocide can be the most ambiguous at this stage. This further complicates the interpretation and enforcement of international law if the aggressor (State) uses the turbulence caused by declared security and reform policies, i.e., under domestically legal and bureaucratic procedures that adversely affect a groupโs ICH, especially when intended to do so. The 2003 UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage provides a broad interpretation of โcultural heritageโ but still places the onus of the protection of cultural heritage on the State against their intentional destruction. The 2003 Declaration also consolidates peacetime protections for [intangible] cultural heritage and the responsibilities of States across the entirety of international cultural heritage law applicable during peacetime. While Article VI of the Declaration covers State responsibility in the event of destruction of cultural heritage regardless of whether it is inscribed on a UNESCO or another international organizationโs list, under international law, there is debate about the lack of explicitly lower thresholds of what constitutes heritage, especially when the affected and disenfranchised groups tend to have a more holistic approach to what is considered cultural heritage.
While it is no secret that the enforcement of international law is entirely subjective based on the enforcing Stateโs interest, the protections afforded to ICH face significant challenges during peacetime, especially if its targeting is constantly upheld through perceived innocuous policies citing higher priority agendas such as reform and security campaigns, regardless of intent โ unless the intention is explicitly stated. While a trend can be drawn retrospectively, the high threshold for what constitutes ICH and what can and must be protected by States becomes an ambiguity which can be adjusted conveniently, especially when the affected groups have a lower threshold and a higher degree of holistic approach to what they consider their ICH and its destruction. This gradual and subtle wedging and fragmenting of customs and practices (while having multiple effects on the affected groupโs identity) allows political precedent to be set to trigger further cascading motions of dehumanization and disassociation of identity from the group.
The growing population and economies of South Asia are crucially dependent on its rivers and lands. Major rivers like Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus are the main sources of agriculture, energy, and livelihood. The region inhabits about a quarter of the world's population but only around four percent of its renewable waters. Global Environmental Change (GEC) is exacerbating glacial melt and shifting monsoon patterns causing extreme frequent floods and droughts. In terms of energy, South Asia is facing chronic deficiency - infrastructure strain and fuel import dependence have led many areas without reliable power. Experts argue that without new and efficient sources of energy which is causing โenergy and power shortagesโ, could lead to crises. Altogether, these strains on water, food, and energy, accentuates urgent need for coordinated policies.
The Water-Energy-Food Nexus in South Asia
Water produces energy and is crucial for agriculture which provides food. Water management is โundoubtedly complex and interlinked with other significant challenges, including energy and food security, [and] agricultural productionโ. Agriculture uses most of South Asiaโs freshwater and its farmers are heavily dependent on groundwater for irrigation. The tubewells/pumps used for the irrigation are run by diesel or electricity, which means energy shortfalls or high costs would adversely impact food production. Reciprocally, thermal power plants need high volumes of water for cooling, so water scarcity can also put strain on energy output. On the other hand, hydropower depends on rivers that also irrigate agricultural lands. In sum, activities in one sector often popple across other sectors. Integrated and coordinated approaches are therefore important for planning.
The stress due to GEC intensifies these interlinked water-food-energy nexus. Glacial melt and extreme droughts may lead to pumping of more groundwater, increasing demands for energy and depleting aquifers. Moreover, extreme droughts or floods can sever power generation. In the absence of cross-sectoral planning, South Asian countries are risking the opportunity to solve one problem, only to worsen another. In view of this, analysts argue that any policies for South Asian โdevelopmentโ must take into account these interdependencies.
Transboundary Water Management
Majority of South Asiaโs waters come from the high Himalayas - highlighting the transnational character of these waters. These basins flow across multiple countries, yet formal cooperation is very limited and narrow in scope. No region-wide institution is in place to manage these shared basins with the exception of a few bilateral treaties that cover dozens of cross-boundary rivers. For example, India and Bangladesh, which share fifty-four rivers, have a Joint Rivers Commission and a 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty. India and Pakistan have the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 - but currently in abeyance. India also has a 1996 Mahakali Treaty with Nepal as well as multiple powersharing agreements with Bhutan. Despite these limited agreements, there is no comprehensive cooperative framework among all riparians, majority of whose headwaters originate in China.
This assortment of water sharing is not sufficient in times of growing demands. Urbanizations and agricultural expansion are exploiting rivers and groundwater unsustainably, putting the region under water stress unless there is any improvement in management. Yet national policies are centred around short-term un-sustainable developmental goals without any consideration of its cross-sectoral and cross-boundary impacts. In these crucial times, countries prioritizing zero-sum games and competition over collaboration highlight how much they are worried about human and environmental security instead of national - ironically achieving neither.
Building of trust among South Asian countries is a constant challenge because of factors not limited to historical rivalries and concerns - which has led to minimal transparency and sharing of crucial environmental data. Increased data sharing and transparency are critical for riparian countries to negotiate equal and sustainable usage of waters. If the riparian countries of South Asia seek shared water security, cooperation over conflict offers a good chance for equitable and sustainable management.
Regional Energy Integration
South Asian countries are exploring cross-border trade of power to fill energy gaps. A World Bank researcher argues that in case of a unified South Asian regional โmarketโ, untapped hydro resources could nearly double its generation capacity, and adding a moderate carbon tax could raise hydropower output by roughly 2.7 times over two decades. Another analysis highlights that electricity sharing would let South Asian countries exploit complementarities - for example, distribution of surplus peak to deficit area.
Some regional approaches are in process of materializing. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal are discussing grid connections and energy corridors. For example, plans for an Easter Waterways Grid proposes linking river ports and transmission lines between India and Bangladesh, also connecting Bhutan and Nepal to facilitate trade. This initiative is projected to benefit some six-hundred million people across the sub-region. India has already positioned itself as a power-trade hub - it exports power to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal, while importing from Bhutan and Nepal. These examples are early steps toward a limited integrated system. If expanded to all South Asian countries, such trading would allow surplus power to flow in deficit regions, smoothing out fluctuations and lowering costs. Achieving sustainable energy security in South Asia is only possible through regional collaboration.
Agriculture, Food Security, Energy
Agriculture is the biggest provider of employment and food security in South Asia. It needs both water and energy, not only for irrigation but also for fertilisation, mechanisation, and post-harvest cold storage. Irrigation uses majority of freshwater in some areas. This means that any shortage in water or power can directly impact the crop production and harvests. Ignoring these linkages could backfire and undermine both food and energy security of the region.
As of 2021, nearly eight percent of the people in region lack access to reliable grid-based electricity, an forty-seven percent remain inaccessible to clean cooking fuels and technologies. In addition to this, the existing inefficiencies of the system has given rise to a three-fold challenge - โenergy security, energy equity, and environmental sustainabilityโ.
GEC-led variability adds complex challenges to the food production. The changing monsoon patterns and decreasing glacial melt in late summer can leave fields parched at important times. Simultaneously, increase in the occurrence of frequent floods are damaging crops and land. A cooperative regional approach could help reducing these risks. For example, sharing efficient practices in irrigation or rural electrification would yield benefits. Coordinated flood forecasting and storage-release policies could improve water use across borders to protect food and power systems.
Conclusion
The potential benefits of collaboration is enormous. For example, the increase in hydropower generation through regional markets could replace the need for expensive fuel-import, reducing carbon emissions and energy costs. An efficient, coordinated, and equitable water management could protect agriculture and industry from instability. The increase in transboundary power trade could also secure energy. Shared infrastructure could improve disaster resilience. Though this article may seem pointing towards a more ideal scenarios, but acknowledging the geopolitical barriers, water-food-energy nexus itself leaves no choice but to accept the fact that share challenges need shared solutions.
Having started as a peace project and as an advocate of the rule of law, human rights, and liberal values in Europe and worldwide, it makes only sense that the EU also seeks to maintain its position as a normative power. Since the early 2000s, the EU has also opened increasingly loud debates about its capacities in the realms of security and defence, culminating in the establishment of the common security and defence policy (CSDP). However, it can be argued that ever since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trumpโs re-appropriation of power in the US, traditionally the primary provider of military security for many EU members, it was no longer a mere desire, but an actual necessity to become a realist power as well.
Now, the EU finds itself stuck in a complex situation: it is a market power, wants to be a normative power, and needs to become a realist power. In reality, due to serious inherent obstacles, it is highly challenging to fulfil a credible role across all these interlinked dimensions of power simultaneously.
Not only are there different pledges of allegiance to NATO, strategic cultures, and threat perceptions within the EU, all of which are long-known impediments to the EU as a unified realist power alongside domestic politics, but different foreign policy approaches nowadays even actively undermine the EU's efforts to be recognised as such. The most apparent is this in differing stances on sanctions and weapons deliveries in the context of Russiaโs aggression against Ukraine.
As a realist power, the EU pushes to support Ukraine with military equipment (partly also to sustain its values, thus holding up the flag as a normative power, indicating how intertwined the realms really are), yet Hungary, as the prime example, vetoes such decisions regularly. Simultaneously, Hungary is put under pressure by the EU for its rule of law violations. The situation illustrates the difficulty: Firstly, it underscores the inability of the EU to speak with one voice as a realist power. Secondly, and maybe even more dramatically, it undermines its assumed role as a normative power when Hungary uses its veto to pressure the EU โfor example, in the context of funding held back due to the transgression of EU values โand succeeds. If the EU needs to grant exceptions in the normative realm to pursue goals in the realist realm, an inextricable dilemma emerges, where it canโt be both a full normative and a realist power at the same time. In the case of sanctions, a realist tool that market powers can apply, the situation is similar. With Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia and the recent electoral success of Andre Babiลก in the Czech Republic, the number of EU members inclined to torpedo harsh measures on Russia has risen.
Source: illustration generated using OpenAI for visualisation purposes.
Notwithstanding, even outside Eastern and Central Europe, some instances can potentially hamper the EUโs triad of being a market, normative and realist power all at once. For example, did Belgium veto the use of frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine due to large parts of these currently being custodied in the country? Moreover, Spainโs reluctance to raise its defence budget significantly, as demanded by its allies, given its location far from Europeโs frontlines and strategically contested areas, shows that the perception of urgency is not necessarily equally distributed across Union members.
The picture of the EUโs power is confused in a time that calls for unity and stringent action. How unhandy it comes in presently; at large, it alludes to the complexity that the EU, as an object โsui generisโ and with all its heterogeneity, has always lived with. These current, challenging times will therefore be a real test of the extent to which the EU can be a plausible power beyond markets.
The EUโs evolution into a multi-faceted power highlights both its aspirations and inherent contradictions. Though it seeks to promote normative values worldwide, the situation in Hungary underscores the limitations of these ideals when confronted with complex political and economic realities. Amid the current geopolitical landscapeโcharacterised by Trumpโs re-election and a nearby conflictโthe EU faces a significant identity crisis. Pressures for defence integration and strategic autonomy intensify, but they encounter institutional blockages and varying national priorities.
To exceed its role as merely an economic powerhouse with fragmented political will, it must align its values with its actions and move beyond half-measures. The Union is now at a pivotal point: it can either establish itself as a unified strategic actor or remain a more economically motivated Union with political ambitions. The next few months will reveal whether the notion of being โstronger togetherโ is a genuine commitment or merely a catchphrase.
Recent months and weeks have shown a significant increase in headlines concerning drones, cyber-attacks, and hybrid warfare in the context of the RussiaโUkraine war.
The airports of Berlin, Heathrow and Brussels were reportedly hit by cyber-attacks, causing significant delays and safety concerns for passengers. Then it continued with several drone sightings causing disruption at airports such as Munich. The German Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) has officially released a statement saying that there is increased concern in the following areas namely: firstly, Russiaโs attacks on Ukraine have prompted Germany and other Western countries to strengthen their security agendas, secondly, cyber-attacks have become an increasing threat since the start of the war making Germany the target for disinformation campaigns launched by Russia, thirdly, Germany must better protect its critical infrastructure against sabotage. With these incidents one can ask the following questions: How prepared is the West to face cyber and hybrid attacks? How should countries react in the future and are there serious concerns for drone warfare? Must the west continue to change its cyber-strategy as well as its hybrid warfare strategy?
Germany and the West against drones
We have seen a significant increase in drone sightings in the past months. Headlines of drones and even balloon sightings disrupting airports have caused concern and heated debates amongst civilians and of course government officials. Munich has been in the focus of the recent drone sightings causing the airport to suspend all flights. Twice the airport saw drones over the airport and had to stop all flights causing around 6,500 passengers to be affected. This has caused the German government to activate the German Military to be involved in battling drones more strongly and be trained in such scenarios. As of yet, it is unclear who is responsible for these drone incidents. However, whether itโs private or a state actor, they have managed significant disturbance and caused the EU and NATO to want to act more strongly to be better prepared for hybrid warfare. In addition, AI is also having a significant impact on how countries are developing weapons and defence against threats causing more uncertainty.
In international relations there still remains much scepticism and different view points on whether cyber-attacks can be considered to have a โviolent impactโ at all. Lucas Kello (2017) discusses in his work โThe Virtual Weaponโ the point that scholars leaning towards the Clausewitzian school of thought do not believe that โcyber operations are not directly violent. Nor do they create significantly collateral damage.โ1 This may be true on some level if we were to discuss whether the drones had a physical impact on civilian lives but when daring to combine international relations with sociological theories, it always depends on the following aspects: What do we understand under violence? When is an act violent? And who decides when an act is violent in hybrid warfare?
Taking the Munich and Belgium drone incident from September 2025 into account โ with considering what we know and do not know so far โ the following impacts can be identified: it has caused unrest, concern amongst civilians (some surveys by national news outlets indicate that roughly one in two respondents now express concern about foreign drone attacks at home) and officials, a summit in Copenhagen and from the police in Germany to be able to shoot down drones more easily when in sight.
One could argue so far, no physical violence has been caused however, is unrest amongst countries and cities and heightened security measures that cause unrest also a form of violence? Is the uncertainty over who is behind the drone incidents itself a form of disturbance? Will this add to a certain cyber strategy of ramping up defences? Or is it more of a back-and-forth game of cyber and drone attacks happening and the West reacting with closing defence holes?
The Copenhagen Summit and hybrid warfare
The summit showed heated debates amongst the countries. As of this moment, there is no concrete evidence that Russia is behind the drone incidents; however, countries such as Denmark have strongly suggested possible Russian involvement due to the recent MiG-31 jet crossing in Estonian airspace. It can be seen as a form of โpokingโ NATO to see what kind of reaction can be achieved however, caution is advised when drawing conclusions.
Several other drones were sighted: โDrones have been seen in recent days over Germany's northern state of Schleswig-Holstein, and flights have been delayed in the past week at Vilnius airport in Lithuania and at Oslo airport in Norway because of drone activity.โ Western nations may need to strengthen their cybersecurity and defence systems, such as, establishing a โdrone wallโ.
Perhaps the EUโs plans for AI Gigafactories can contribute to developing such systems in tackling drones more effectively in the near future: โSectoral flagships including targeted measures to boost AI adoption across 10 key industry sectors and the public sector. The industrial sectors include (โฆ) energy, agri-food; defence, security and space (โฆ).โ What Germany plans to invest in anti-drone equipment, which should also be put to use in other countries called โSkyrangerโ. Furthermore, experts from Universities such as TU Dresden state that one should invest more strongly in protecting critical infrastructure, such as airports, by installing lasers, jammers and radars, to name a few examples, but will this truly help in deterring attacks? Perhaps the aggressor will not see this a true deterrence and defence and will simply continue with โprobingโ or launching drones just to cause unrest.
The Summit has shown that members of the EU and NATO are concerned and are willing to step up their defence in the cyber and hybrid warfare areas. One cannot deny that the drones have targeted so-called critical infrastructure of the West namely: airports. It would be important to focus on all possible critical infrastructure in relation to drones and cyber-attacks such as hospitals, transportation systems, government buildings and energy structures (to name a few). These should be securely protected against drone disruptions as well as cyber-attacks which seems to be no new statement but should be highlighted nonetheless.
What do we know so far and what do we need to ask ourselves next?
Clausewitzian skeptics are wary of cyber-attacks having a physical or traditional war perspective effect. One can conclude that in the last years the landscape of international relations has changed and states, countries and individuals are rapidly adapting with using technology (also drones) to achieve certain means.
As for now, Russia has not claimed responsibility for the recent cyber-attacks and drone incidents,* which adds to the uncertainty* in cyber scenarios. Countries in this new type of โwarfareโ often act based on suspicion and what is discussed amongst scholars, โtit for tatโ and to โcoerce the enemy into acting a certain wayโ. One cannot say for certain at this moment if this is the intention of all the incidents however, it is certain that action needs to be taken to ensure a better defence and quicker reaction time. It also makes it clear that countries have to continue to rapidly adapt their strategy (also their cyber-strategy) in all directions in order to keep up with the changing landscape of conflicts.
At present, it cannot be stated with certainty that the cyber-attacks on the airports or the drone incidents had a physical violent impact however, they have significant delays, disturbance and a renewed debate concerning security. Both cyber-attacks and drones pose a threat to NATO member states and other Western countries and should be taken more strongly into account when investing in defence and a certain โcyber-strategyโ.
The following questions should guide future consideration: how can the West and the EU defend and react quicker in relation to cyber-attacks and drone incidents? Will the new plans to allow police to shoot down drones have a positive impact or cause further probing? Can AI and the investment in technology allow countries such as Germany to develop defence walls quicker than 2030?
Developing the so-called โdrone wallโย represents an initial response and could aid in the defence of countries against probing drones however, it should still be critically analysed who is behind the incidents and additional sanctions could be considered once attribution is established, to reduce uncertainty. The more certain one is of who is behind certain actions, the better a preparation can be put into place. This may add to the strategy in a certain โhybrid warfareโ but one cannot be for certain how it will develop in the near future since technology is also developing at a rapid speed. Perhaps states will be drawn into an endless โtit-for-tatโ2 game with implementing sanctions against cyber-attacks or better defence systems against drones however, these questions merit further analysis and discussion to gain a better understanding of how such potential hybrid conflicts could play out.
When one continues to critically ask these questions, then a good strategy can be developed in order to tackle the emerging challenges in cyber and drone incidents. As Richard P. Rumelt notes a bad strategy would be to mistake the end goals as the strategy itself3. The latter is commonly depicted as being the ends, ways and means and when applying this to the current international political landscape, it must remain fluid and multidimensional to adapt to rapidly changing technologies.
Lucas Kello, The Virtual Weapon, Oxford, page 31 โฉ๏ธ
ย Valeriano Brandon et al, โCyber Strategyโ 2018, oxford university press, page 226. โฉ๏ธ
ย Richard P. Rumelt, โGood Strategy, Bad Strategy โ The Difference and Why it Matters,โ pg 47. โฉ๏ธ
With a PhD from the European University Institute and extensive expertise in foreign policy analysis, EU-Russia relations, democratisation, and European security, Dr Giusti sheds light on how cultural heritage is being weaponised in the war in Ukraine. The discussion covers Russiaโs policies before and after the invasion, deliberate targeting of heritage sites, the trafficking of stolen cultural items, their use in sanctions evasion, and strategies to counter these hybrid threats.
Interviewers: Julia Hodgins and Francesco Pagano - Culture, Society & Security Desk
By Joshua Yow and Shams Jouve - Crime, Terrorism & Extremism Desk
The present state of political violence
On the 10th of September 2025, Charlie Kirk was shot and killed while speaking at an outdoor Turning Point USA event on the campus of Utah Valley University. Tyler Robinson, a 22-year-old, was subsequently arrested by the police and charged with Kirkโs murder.
This killing quickly became a national flashpoint, sparking a broader debate on rising political violence and deepening party polarisation, culminating in a highly publicised and elaborately high-level memorial service for Kirkโs death.
However, this ongoing escalation of violence in the United States is not an unprecedented phenomenon. Following John F. Kennedyโs death, a wave of violence directly targeting political figures was observed, resulting in the assassination of key political leaders and civil rights activists between 1960 and 1970.
While those events also deepened political divisions, todayโs environment is fundamentally different. Social media has become a defining factor, setting this crisis apart from earlier episodes, with Utah Governor Spencer Cox noting that โsocial media has played a role in every single assassination attempt that we have seen over the last five, six yearsโ, in a speech reacting to Charlie Kirkโs death. To understand the changes in the state of political violence, this article aims to identify the current modes of violence and the factors that accelerate them.
Polarisation is further powered by the spread of disinformation and misinformation online. Elites also play a disproportionate role within this dynamic, as โsocial media can provide [them] with the ability to shape their supportersโ opinions and mobilise turnout for elections and political eventsโ, often by disseminating polarising content. Furthermore, the mediatic and political scene in the US reinforce these existing divisions, privileging the most extreme voices, where โthe incentives that fuel American political life reward the people and platforms that turn up the heat, not those who dial tensions down.โ This highly charged political rhetoric results in a declining faith in institutions, which creates a feedback loop of violence.
Chavalarias notes that though echo chambers can form offline, online processes clearly enable the fast development of tensions directly impacting offline relationships. Thus, political violence should not be confined solely to online dynamics, but should be attributed to a convergence of deeper structural causes like economic insecurity, demographic anxiety, and increasingly provocative political discourses, ultimately contributing to growing fault lines. These ideological disagreements, transformed into personal animosity, have been heightened by social media, as well as the spread of conspiracy theories and personal grievances.
The methods and meanings of radicalisation
The methods of Tyler Robinson, the accused perpetrator, are also telling of the present climate of political radicalisation. His actions are indicative of a wider pattern of lone-actor or small-cell attacks that erupt out of political grievance rather than from hierarchical, organised forms of gang-related violence or terrorism. Robinsonโs signalling to an online audience, including referential engravings alluding to internet subculture, is not a new phenomenon, but it is one of growing concern. It reflects how extremist communication increasingly panders to these echo chambers present within internet culture. The purpose of these engravings goes beyond the traditional manifesto, instead acting as performative cues to in-group communities that subsequently propagate the act and idea of violence.
When this form of political extremism is coupled with a perpetratorโs unhindered access to the internet, this makes sources of online radicalisation much more opaque, which in turn makes the attribution of violence increasingly nebulous by leaving a vacuum of motive, encouraging a partisan narrative-setting after the act of killing.
Robinsonโs targeting of a political commentator instead of a government official also signals a shift from attacking positions of formal power towards an attack on rhetoric and identity. Kirkโs confrontational debate style has also made him a visible symbol, inviting division between his supporters and their opponents, while crystallising division within the American population. This reflects how demonstrations and public events have become focal points for violence, evoking the public stage as a site of contest, therefore revealing a nexus between policy and performance, which is present within echo chambers, audiences, and their associated performative cues.
Ripple effects/ Consequences: What does it mean for American society?
Source: President Donald Trump takes the stage with Erika Kirk at the Memorial Service for Charlie Kirk at State Farm Stadium in Glendale, Arizona, Sunday, September 21, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok) - Flickr
One sector feeling the strain is academia. In Canada, for instance, the University of Alberta placed several professors on non-disciplinary leave following threats linked to reactions surrounding Kirkโs death. Within the U.S., the climate for free speech on university campuses has also grown increasingly tense. A 2024 survey found that 27% of students agreed that campuses should โprohibit speech they may find offensive,โ up from 22% in 2021.
The debate surrounding Kirkโs death has also reignited broader discussions about First Amendment rights, which safeguard fundamental freedoms such as free expression. In a controversial statement, Vice President J.D. Vance asserted that theย First Amendment โdoes not protect those who celebrated Kirkโs death from consequences.โย His remarks came shortly after the President announced that the Antifa movement would be designated a terrorist organizationโโjust one of many actions,โย according to a White House official,ย โto address left-wing organizations that fuel political violence.โ
Critics of the governmentโs response to Kirkโs assassination have themselves faced backlash. Some have received threats, others have lost their jobs, and even prominent figures in entertainment have come under pressure. Late-night host Jimmy Kimmel, for example, was briefly suspended by ABC (owned by Disney) after joking that the โMAGA gangโ was attempting to score political points from Kirkโs death; the network later reinstated him following public criticism.
Already, Kirk has been enshrined within martyrdom by the Republican Party, shifting the attention away from the root cause of rising rates of gun violence. These party divisions are further capitalised on during the Kirkโs Memorial, blending American Evangelicalism and invocations of nationalism as a rallying platform, reinforcing partisan identity cues. This has been exacerbated by right-wing media figures demanding retribution for Kirkโs death, calling Kirkโs killing a declaration of โwarโ, illustrating the increase in sectarian escalation. Public spaces are also changing to reflect the heightened tensions, ushering in a deeper level of securitisation. President Trump also showed up to Kirkโs memorial hidden behind layers of bulletproof glass, reflecting the deep paranoia plaguing the event. Therefore, Kirkโs assassination exists within a self-reinforcing cycle of violence in which lone-actor radicalisation, online echo chambers, and performative politics harden sectarian identities while normalising a securitised public life. Breaking this cycle will depend on elite de-escalation and partisan compromise, though whether either will materialise remains uncertain.
As the United States navigates the fallout of this tragedy, the challenge lies not only in addressing immediate security threats but also in rebuilding a digital and political culture capable of disagreement without dehumanisation.
By Francesco Foti & Giacomo Prosperini - Italy Desk
Introduction
Italyโs strategic engagement in the Mediterranean is characterised by the intricate relationship between energy security, migration management, counter-terrorism and regional stability. This is particularly evident in Libya and Syria, where Italian interests intersect with broader European and global dynamics.
In Libya, Italy is confronted with the ongoing challenges of political fragmentation, competing local authorities, and the increasing influence of external powers. These factors constrain Romeโs capacity to fulfil its traditional role. Energy ties, migration control and managing local armed groups remain crucial levers, yet their effectiveness is increasingly undermined by militia activities, institutional deadlock and disruptive behaviour. The Greenstream pipeline and strategic oil and gas fields, for example, highlight the interdependence between Italian energy security and Libyan stability. However, reliance on fragile authoritarian systems carries great risks. Migration flows and criminal networks further exacerbate the challenges to Italian security, exposing the country to ethical dilemmas and limiting the effectiveness of regulatory strategies. In order to navigate this arena of geostrategic interests, it seems essential to strike a balance between short-term priorities, such as ensuring an adequate energy supply and controlling immigration, and long-term objectives, such as promoting institutional reforms to foster stability and coordinating effectively with European partners.
Conversely, the long civil war and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria have exacerbated Europeโs security and migration challenges. Italy must strike a delicate balance, engaging with the new regime, countering extremist networks and managing refugee flows, all the while coordinating with European partners whose policies are often fragmented and reactive. Iranian and Turkish activities in the region further complicate Italyโs strategic calculations by influencing local governance and regional security dynamics. In response, Italy has pushed for Syria to be included in the EUโs external action agenda, proposing a broader strategy to address the complex challenges arising from the civil war, particularly the pressure on migration routes. However, this effort faces significant obstacles: the lack of a coherent policy from Western partners, coupled with the unresolved nature of the Syrian government, means that Rome must adopt a carefully calibrated approach that tackles the root causes of instability, migration flows and potential terrorist threats in order to mitigate them.
Taken together, these cases illustrate the limitations of a purely reactive or ad hoc approach. Italy should combine pragmatic diplomacy with long-term strategic planning, leveraging its historical ties primarily with Libya, expanding the external action in Syria, an economic presence, and enhancing regional credibility compared to France and the UK in Libya and Syria. The following analysis examines the Italian approach to Libya and Syria, highlighting the key dilemmas, vulnerabilities and opportunities that currently define its Mediterranean policy.
Post-Gaddafi Libya: Fragmentation and Political Deadlock
Among the multiple crises shaping the Mediterranean region, Libya remains a test case for Italy's ability to convert its geographical proximity into tangible influence. Romeโs interests - namely energy partnerships through ENIโs long-standing operations; containment of irregular migration; and broader regional stability - have been persistently undermined by Libya's political fragmentation since Gaddafi's regime collapsed in 2011. However, rather than redefining its strategy, Italy has tended to oscillate between ad hoc crisis management and a reliance on international processes that have produced limited results.
The post-2011 landscape in Libya remains marked by deep political and territorial tensions. Since Gaddafi's downfall, the country has been divided into two rival authorities: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by Turkey and Qatar, and General Haftarโs Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, supported by by Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. The existence of these two factions turned the conflict into a proxy arena for regional and global powers. This foreign interference has further weakened Italyโs previously privileged position, highlighting its diplomatic inferiority compared to more assertive external actors. Moreover, the proliferation of several armed groups with tribal and regional roots has created a security environment in which no single actor can guarantee stability.
Despite international initiatives, such as the Palermo Conference (2018) promoted by Italy and the Berlin Process (2020) Libya remains in deadlock. Tensions between historical Libyan provinces, rivalries between revolutionary and pro-Gaddafi factions, and competition over control of resources have undoubtedly fuelled instability. The repeated postponement of elections, most notably in December 2021, exposed the legal ambiguities of Libyaโs institutional framework, as well as the reluctance of key stakeholders to embark on a genuine political transition. The absence of a coherent EU external action in the Mediterranean, coupled with minimal US involvement, has restricted Italyโs freedom of action in Libya. This has contributed to the country adopting temporary policies instead of pursuing a strategic and forward-looking approach.
This persistent stalemate raises uncomfortable questions for Italy: should Rome continue to invest in fragile diplomatic efforts that have yielded little progress, or should it recalibrate its approach by prioritising narrower interests, such as energy and migration management? Either option involves significant trade-offs between short-term stability and long-term credibility.
Italy and Libya Energy Nexus
Italy's involvement in Libya has long been influenced by its reliance on energy ties, with ENI playing a key role in diplomatic engagement and economic influence, particularly in the energy sector through ENI. The Italian multinational oil and gas companyโs operations in the Wafa and El Feel oil and gas fields, directly connected to Sicily through the Greenstream pipeline underline how closely linked Italyโs energy security is to Libyan stability. Yet this reliance, which once gave Rome leverage, is increasingly revealing its fragility. ENIโs strategic assets are at the mercy of Libyaโs internal rivalries and armed groups' bargaining, which turns energy security into a structural vulnerability rather than a source of strength.
The war in Ukraine has further enlarged this paradox. As Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian energy dependence, Libya is seen as a key alternative for Italy and the EU. However, production remains subject to political instability and militia activity, as demonstrated by the blockade of the Ras Lanuf oil terminal in 2023. These events demonstrate that Italian energy policy relies on the temporary support of local groups, which ultimately renders it incapable of influencing the Libyan economy. This vulnerability is worsened by the absence of an EU external action strategy in the Mediterranean, bringing Italy to largely manage these challenges on its own and to take on responsibilities that could better be shared at the EU level.
Italy therefore faces a strategic dilemma. While an approach that prioritises energy guarantees immediate supplies, it risks binding Rome to a model of dependence on fragile authorities and undermining its ability to act as a regional stabiliser. Alternatively, Italy could leverage its presence in the energy sector for diplomatic gain, but only if reforms are implemented to stabilise and transparently manage the country's political and economic affairs. The choice is both technical and geopolitical: Italy can either remain a passive observer of the instability in Libya, or it can take an active role in ensuring security in the Mediterranean through energy diplomacy.
Migration, Security, and Human Rights
Libya remains one of the main departure points for migration to Europe, particularly along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy. Due to its proximity to Italy, the Libyan coast is a key โhotspotโ where thousands of migrants and refugees, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, attempt dangerous sea crossings to reach Italian shores. For Italy, this influx of migrants is not only a humanitarian concern, but also an increasing security issue.
In response, the country has pursued a containment strategy, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard in intercepting and returning migrants before they reach European waters. However, these practices have sparked widespread criticism from various NGOs and the UN, who argue that Italian support effectively enables the return of migrants to Libyan detention centres, where conditions are described as inhumane and characterised by torture, extortion, continuous violence and abuse. The absence of effective border control, coupled with the fragmentation of the Libyan security apparatus, encourages the mobility of jihadist groups and foreign fighters, especially in southern Libya and across the Sahel. For Italy, the intersection of human trafficking, organised crime, and potential terrorist infiltration poses a multidimensional threat to national and regional security. By relying on Libyan authorities, Italy risks associating its migration policy with serious human rights violations. This tension is augmented by the lack of a unified European approach in terms of migratory policy. The limitations of the Dublin Regulation and the ambiguities of the EUโs New Pact on Migration and Asylum highlight the absence of a true European solidarity system, leaving frontline states such as Italy with a disproportionate amount of responsibility. This tension highlights a deeper dilemma, as short-term containment could come at the expense of international credibility and moral authority.
The suspension of operations for ten international NGOs and the UNHCR by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (LISA) in April 2025 further complicates the landscape. This suspension is a clear sign of Libya's increasingly securitarian and repressive shift, where international cooperation on migration is becoming increasingly subordinate to political and military interests. Italy and the EU now face a critical dilemma: should they continue to support authoritarian and violent actors in order to contain migration flows, or should they rethink their foreign policy in light of international law and human rights principles? Every path involves trade-offs. Disengagement could lead to uncontrolled migration flows, while continued support could reinforce inhumane authoritarian practices and destabilise the region.
The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and the GNA Turkey expanded Turkey's territorial waters in the Mediterranean, raising tensions with Greece and Cyprus. This Turkish expansion has created a new geopolitical dynamic in the Eastern Mediterranean, making it more difficult for Italy to assert its influence in Libya. By relying on its traditional influence and bilateral relations, Rome risks being marginalized in decision-making processes affecting both Libya and the wider region. Indeed, Turkey's increased presence in Tripoli means direct competition for control of energy resources, migration routes, and political alliances within Libya.
Should Italy adopt a proactive approach to limit Turkish influence and risk exacerbating regional tensions, or should it pursue multilateral coordination within the EU and NATO to preserve access and long-term stability? Either way, there are risks. A confrontational approach could provoke retaliation and further instability, while inaction could further erode Italy's strategic influence.
Italy and the Syrian Crisis: A Geopolitical, Security and Migratory Perspective
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the West has been dealing with the consequences of a new Syria. Southeastern European countries have borne the brunt of the instability caused by the 14-year civil war. Southern EU countries' capacity to process migrants at their first point of entry into Europe has been significantly impacted by it. The disproportionate burden could also be posing a security risk, including instances of radicalisation and terrorismdocumented in Italy that reverberate at the single EU countryโs level. A fragmented Syria complicates the security crisis. An extremist or ineffectual government that harbours or exports radical violent individualsshould not be ruled out, given the past of HTS and the explosions of violence involving former loyalists,Alawites,Druze, andChristians.
EU Policy Failures on Syrian Migration
At the EU level, inconsistent application and failure to reform or uniform the Dublin Regulation have contributed to the instability in the Mediterranean and impacted Italyโs capabilities, thus signalling a lack of European approach. The refusal to reform the Dublin treaty and the lack of a broad approach to the security crisis by relying only on Libya, Egypt, and Turkey as a way to stem the flow underscore the European limited role in addressing the Syrian issue. The 2016 migration between Turkey and the EU exemplifies the European strategy of exchanging political concessions and funding for assistance in curbing migration flows.
Italyโs Legal and Diplomatic Response to the Syrian Crisis
Italy has temporarily suspended aspects of the asylum registration process under emergency measures, currently contested in court. To help manage migration, the Albania Agreement (2023) served as an option currently under discussion at the European level. The Italian government has passed a restrictiveLaw n. 187/2024 on immigration, and the annual immigration quota decree. The agreement and the laws implemented have been impugned by the courts which has limited their enforceability. The same impasse is observable across other EU countries.
An Italian geopolitical approach?
Due to European limitations and approach, the Italian position is limited to diplomatic, investment and humanitarian initiatives. Italy thinks that dealing with the Syrian government, whether in the form of Assad or HTS, is the starting point to address the question of immigration from instability. Lifting sanctions was presented as leading to cooperation in terms of infrastructure and business opportunities, which could boost the recovery and bring about stability to address the root causes. Italy should be watching theinterregnum phase as this might precipitate another immigration crisis.Italian pragmatism should take into consideration the Turkish role, activism andexceptionalism of which Greece and Cyprus have long been vocal. Italy should clearly demand Turkey halt any unilateral actions in Northern Syria that have not been agreed upon with NATO and EU allies. Turkish military operations targeting the Kurds risk destabilising by triggering artificial resettlement, increased displacement and growth of refugee camps amid deterioration of humanitarian conditions. Furthermore, as shown by the 2020 Turko-Greek crisis, Turkish use of immigration as a hybrid threat exposes European inaction and the limits of the Italo-Turkish partnership in the face of unchecked Turkish militarism. Turkish actions frequently blur the distinction between support for moderates and extremists, thus undermining both the security of Syrian-controlled areas and prospects for the eventual, gradual return of refugees to Europe.
Italy should also reassess its approach to Iranian influence in Syria and the broader Levantine region. A critical component of this reassessment involves evaluating Iranโs use of sectarian dynamics to extend its regional influence, a strategy that has historically contributed to instability and, in turn, increased migration pressures toward Europe. While Iran will still remain an actor to reckon with in Syria, particularly through its support of the Shias and Alewites, the evolving political landscape in Damascus warrants close scrutiny. Italy should remain vigilant to any Iranian efforts to recalibrate its role and maintain leverage in the region, as this may have implications for both regional stability and require Italyโs bilateral relations with Tehran to be re-evaluated.
Israel'srecent actions show awareness of the need to ensure Syria does not spiral into all-out sectarianism. However, Italyโs relationship with Israel has come under strain in light of recent developments in Gaza. Unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, France, or Spain, Italy has avoided openly criticizing Israelโs actions. However, it has also refrained from vocally supporting Israeli airstrikes in Syria, which Israel claims are aimed at protecting the Druze minority from government aggression. This ambiguous stance reflects an inconsistent policy line that fails to address the broader challenge of sectarianism in the region.
In light of the Lebanese government's recent call for the disarmament of Hezbollahโa paramilitary Shia organizationโItaly should formally support this initiative as a necessary measure to curb the regional spread of sectarianism from Lebanon into Syria. Such a stance is particularly warranted given Hezbollahโs alignment with the Iran-backed "axis of resistanceโ. So far, the Syrian government declined to take decisive steps.
A Western response
The West lacks a broad commitment to the Syrian issue, other than previously supporting rebels, much like with Libyaโs Gaddafi and the French-led regime change without clear post-intervention commitment. A cautious approach requires that the EU and US pressure should not be lifted, avoiding aquick diplomatic clout, until the course of Ahmed al-Sharaa becomes clear without ambiguity and sectarianism. A long-term plan comprising stabilisation, limiting the influence of geopolitical rivals and continuous pressure could tackle the root causes for massive immigration to Europe. Activism within the EU framework requires the US to be involved, and the easing pressure not be too speedy, given the uncertain direction of HTS. The Western powers should refrain from arming HTS and pressure others, such as Ukraine, not to overreach.
A new approach?
The Albanian model should be internalised and made into EU law, thus securing funding and being administered by the EU itself, and a quota system approved at the European level. The Italian government should stress the security dimension of the deal to frame it as a public safety tool and a faster, more humane processing. Italy should invite other countries in a joint governance of the centres to share the burden but also show the profits of the model. The EU should have an updated approach to cooperate with the Syrian authorities on repatriations, limit Turkish, Iranian and Qatari influence and pressure them not to engage in sectarianism. Italy should also take centre stage and bring the issue of the future West-Syria relations to the fore to help form a broad Western initiative that should, however, be security-based and geopolitical before focusing on immigration, trade and investment. This requires a new perspective on the actors in the Syrian playground based on the Libyan case that saw the rushed support for rebels that replaced the dictator turning out to breed chaos and new security challenges met inconsistently by the western powers.
Conclusions
Analyses of the situations in Libya and Syria highlight several key lessons for Italyโs Mediterranean strategy. Firstly, both crises demonstrate the limitations of reactive or ad hoc approaches. Short-term interventions in areas such as energy, migration and security often fail to address the root causes of political fragmentation and the influence of external actors. Secondly, while Italyโs traditional levers, such as energy diplomacy, migration management and engagement with local authorities, are necessary, they are insufficient in contexts marked by instability and unpredictable actors. Thirdly, these cases demonstrate that external influences, such as those from Turkey and Russia in Libya and Turkey and Iran in Syria, can significantly restrict Italyโs ability to act alone, making it essential for Italy to coordinate with other EU and NATO partners. Finally, the dilemmas faced in both countries illustrate the persistent tension between immediate interests, such as energy security and migration governance, and long-term objectives, including institutional reform, human rights protection and regional stability.
In light of these lessons, Italy must reassess its strategy in Libya, taking into account the growing influence of Turkey, the ongoing engagement of Iran, and the persistent institutional fragmentation, while also addressing migration management. The continuing stalemate between Tripoli and the eastern authorities, the repeated blockading of oil terminals and the fragility of local governance structures demonstrate that the ad hoc diplomatic and reactive intervention-focused approaches adopted after Gaddafi's fall are no longer sufficient. Yet the limited engagement of the EU in defining a coherent Mediterranean policy compounds these challenges, leaving Rome to act in a largely unilateral way. Italy must therefore combine traditional diplomatic tools with innovative approaches, promoting stability in energy production and reforming local institutions. Together with the need to ensure stability and defend human rights, this will require a comprehensive European approach aimed at preventing Libya from becoming a permanent centre of insecurity along the EUโs southern border.
At the same time, there has been a welcome in Italy for the prospect of closer engagement with the new Syrian authorities. However, these proposals must be carefully evaluated. Rome must consider whether the Al Jolani government can realistically unify diverse communities, combat terrorism and curb extremism. Effective engagement will depend on a holistic Western approach combining incentives and pressure to ensure the new authorities commit to inclusive governance, reject sectarian policies and contribute to long-term stability. A coherent strategy integrating political, security and humanitarian dimensions is essential for mitigating migration flows to Europe and for consolidating Italyโs credibility as a stabilising force in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East.
Since the end of the Cold War, the privatisation of security has emerged in response to transnational security threats. At the same time, with the events of September 11, the global security landscape was completely transformed, with the private security sector playing a crucial role in the fight against terrorism, thus initiating a significant shift in the transition from the mere privatisation of security services to the privatisation of counter-terrorism efforts. Given that Africa has become โthe epicentre of global terrorismโ, the African governments have turned to private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key players in the privatisation process of counter-terrorism and security sector governance, highlighting existing security gaps.
Globalization of Private Security: from the privatisation of security to counter-terrorism privatisation
In the post-Cold War era, the craze for the โprivatisation of securityโ has spread globally in response to โtransnational security threatsโ. This process was associated with efficiency and effectiveness in an international context characterised by numerous failures of centralised โWestphalian statesโ overwhelmed by โsecurity dilemmasโ of a changing nature, especially with the emergence of intra-state conflicts. Meanwhile, a major development in the state system of international relations (IR) has taken place with the reconfiguration of the roles of the state, which has ceded its position as the only legitimate provider and guarantor of security to private and non-state military security agents. Indeed, the increasing prominence of โprivate security entitiesโ as crucial actors in global politics clearly mirrors the transformations in international โsecurity governanceโ characteristic of the postmodern era; consequently, โprivate military firmsโ and โmercenariesโ have evolved into novel types of normative agents that engage in interaction, collaboration, and rivalry, thereby establishing a three-way dynamic of institutionalised security engineering. Nevertheless, this trend results in the breakdown of conventional state governance structures, occurring within a context where the connections between public, private, global, and local domains are being redefined. Simultaneously, the African continent has also been the scene of the interaction between privatisation and the globalisation of security in the midst of the rise of private security providers, going beyond the traditional vision of state authority, which is moving more towards a new complex model of governance involving public and private security actors which blurs the line between internal and external, regional and international security.
The post-September 11 global security environment has offered the private security market a key role in the fight against terrorism; thus, a new turn has begun in changing the path from the privatisation of security to the privatisation of counter-terrorism. However, the formation of public-private partnerships (P3) has intensified with the engagement of private sector security professionals in favour of a broader intersectoral strategy to combat terrorism as part of a standardised approach to โterrorism securitisationโ that includes the contribution of private security actors to prevention efforts. On the one hand, the privatisation of counter-terrorism has been undertaken to meet the intense needs of anti-terrorist cooperation operations abroad, with gaps to be filled in terms of toolboxes, whether in terms of resources, forces, or capabilities. On the other hand, private companies after September 11, 2001, had become de facto subcontractors of โcounter-terrorism security operationsโ traditionally carried out exclusively by state agencies to avoid any control and direct legal responsibility. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has led to an increased reliance on private security companies while emphasising a โstrategic capabilities-based approachโ but also the adoption of a โpreventive counter-terrorism strategyโ against an unknown adversary that requires a refocusing of the mission of the armed forces, where the private sector is actively involved in an operational dynamic of โrisk managementโ and clearly distinguishes it from previous โthreat-based approachesโ. Importantly, private security entities have become a crucial tool in the efforts of governments to maintain national security; thus, the privatisation of counter-terrorism takes several forms, namely open, closed, statutory and non-contractual co-option. Undoubtedly, this is manifested through their central roles to play in counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), in particular in the fight against terrorist financing and in the use of technology to secure infrastructure against cyberterrorism. The private security sector plays an important role both in the prevention and response to critical incidents, including terrorist attacks; moreover, private security personnel provide information, command, control and communications in the management of terrorist risk. This sector has become an effective element of counter-terrorism capabilities and occupies the top level of strategic prevention plans.
The private security and military companies PSMCs in Africa: actors of international security
In Africa, the privatisation of security reflects the major shifts that the concept of security has undergone, moving from the exclusive domain of the State to private actors in a context characterised by hybridity and fragmentation, involving an array of private military and security companies (PMSCs), which have emerged as an alternative path to African security governance, primarily dominated by the erosion of State capacities, with a deficit in the regulation of the security sector. The PMSCs have become regular actors in the African security landscape. Organised as legal corporate entities, they provide a wide range of military and security services, including transport, maintenance, military and police training, demining, intelligence, risk analysis, armed and unarmed protection services, anti-piracy measures, border protection, drones and cyber operations. Indeed, African governments regularly call on transnational corporations (TNCs) to ensure security in areas with limited state status. The PMSCs and non-state actors, notably South Africa's Executive Outcomes (EO), have grown since the end of the Cold War as a result of the state's bankruptcy and the deficit in monopoly and use of power. The intensification of conflicts across the continent has been the driving force behind the privatisation of security, especially since the dynamics of these conflicts remain varied and complicated, and the involvement of the private security sector was a reality even during the post-independence period, due to arbitrary colonial borders and the nature of the post-colonial African state and patrimonialism. In fact, the private security industry also possesses the competence and capacity to conduct conflicts and wars. From this perspective, the increase in conflicts has created a need for private contractors to support and fill operational gaps in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions; thus, PMSCs provide the UN with a multitude of services, including logistics, military training, and security sector reform, becoming key international security actors, and Africa is not immune to this.
The use of PMSCs in Africa has evolved from mercenary to undergo a significant transformation in the 1990s, becoming privatised and business-orientated. Whereas historically these non-state actors have been involved in activities related to civil wars and the exploitation of natural resources. With this in mind, Sierra Leone and Angola have been supported by military companies to fight against rebellions and regain control of diamond-rich regions. In addition, Congo recruited the Belgian company Union Miniรจre between the period from 1960 to 1965. PMSCs often resorted to operations related to coups d'รฉtat and the fight against communism, white supremacy and the preservation of quasi-colonial structures in the 1960s and 1970s. The factors that have led to the rapid growth of the private security sector in Africa are generally linked to human insecurities resulting from the failure or weakness of states in the context of globalisation, which facilitates access to the private security sector, particularly with the commodification of the public sphere and the professionalisation of the armed forces and police in search of profit maximisation accentuated by the liberalisation of the arms trade.
The privatisation of counter-terrorism in Africa: understanding the complex and shifting dynamics
The fight against terrorism has become a priority on the agenda of private security companies in Africa. PMSCs actively support African governments primarily in the areas of combating the spread of transnational security threats, particularly in war governance, counter-insurgency (COIN), and counter-terrorism (CT). In this regard, the South African PMC Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP International Ltd) has intervened against Islamic terrorist groups and Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Sahel region. As a result, in the face of poor governance policies and ineffective management of the terrorist threat and security risks, this has led to the formation of non-state security actors as an intermediate security factor. Security groups like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) were established to combat terrorist groups but as complementary entities to the security architectures of the police and the armed forces to help strengthen security functions. Western PMSCs are heavily involved in the privatisation efforts of counter-terrorism, namely the British Aegis Defence Services and Olive Group, the French companies Secopex and Agemira, the German companies Asgaard and Xeless and the American companies Triple Canopy and Advan Fort Co. Already in 2017, according to a Pentagon report, there were 21 private American security firms in the Sahel. All these entities are engaged in providing multifaceted operations to combat the emergence of extremist jihadist organisations. Thus, African countries receive operational training and logistical support in the field of anti-terrorism cooperation. In the current geopolitical circumstances, the fight against terrorism is the argument put forward by African governments that hire PMCs to counter the spread of jihadist groups. That is why new private military companies are operating in Africa, including Israeli private companies, and the UAE-based Black Shield Security.
The Sahel region in Africa has become a โcoup beltโ, especially since 2020, when military juntas came to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of militant jihadist groups, led by local subsidiaries of the Islamic State group, namely the Islamic State Province in the Sahel (ISSP) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a branch of al-Qaida, has created a chaotic situation, as a result of which civilian and military governments have been unable to combat the security threats posed by jihadist groups, calling on private military and security companies (PMSCs) as key actors in the privatisation process of the fight against terrorism. In truth, the security vacuum and the inability of successive administrations to restore security order in the face of the emergence of an armed rebellion in the remote regions of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, led by groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS), are often instrumentalised by new military governments by promising to deal with Islamist fighters with an excessive reliance on security justification related to growing concerns about transnational insecurity. For example, the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) in Mali used security gaps in the face of the territorial gains of radical jihadists to defend the military takeover in 2021, while in Burkina Faso, the putsch took place in September 2022 due to an inability to fight an Islamic insurgency. Indeed, the private military and security sector in Africa has recently been redefined, making way for new companies from emerging countries in a context of great power struggle, notably through the Chinese Frontier Services Group (FSG), while the Wagner paramilitary group has adopted a militaristic approach to combating terrorism in Africa. However, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa โ Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania โ have sought military and security support in the fight against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. This also partly explains the proliferation of the Turkish International Defence Consulting Company (SADAT), which operates in the Sahel region destabilised by endemic terrorism and fragile security policies.
African approach in the field of the privatization of counter-terrorism: PSMCs within security sector governance and reform (SSG/R)
Despite the fact that the African private sector plays a key role in counter-terrorism missions, including intelligence gathering, border management, humanitarian assistance and reintegration. The use of PMSCs exposes African states to numerous ethical and moral concerns, particularly in terms of national security and sovereignty, as the reliance on private contractors increases the risk of vulnerability and security gaps due to shortcomings in the field of drone technology innovation and territorial surveillance missions. Even more seriously, this is accompanied by the transformation of the notion of the โcitizen-soldierโ looking out for the โcommon goodโ into a โprivate mercenaryโ seeking โindividual financial gainsโ as the primary motivation, which raises the question of the divergence and non-conformity of the interests of PMCs with those of the States in wars and in counter-terrorism theatres of operations. Furthermore, despite attempts to regulate PMSC activities, regional and international efforts are still largely ineffective. In doing so, the use of PMSCs raises a number of ethical issues both in jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as they largely operate outside the effective jurisdiction of national and international law, unlike states and regular soldiers who are subject to a number of laws that restrict the conduct of war under international law. This is why the โMontreux Documentโ constitutes the intergovernmental framework that establishes international legal obligations and good practices for states in terms of PMSC operations during armed conflicts intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law.
South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt legislation regarding PMSCs with the 1998 Foreign Military Assistance Regulation Act and the 2001 Private Security Industry Regulation Act, amended in 2013. While at the regional level, there are numerous efforts by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), to eliminate mercenary activities and regulate the PMSC industry that continues to thrive on the continent. Particularly within the framework of the African Convention on the Elimination of Mercenariesโ in Africa in 1977, notably Article 2(c) and Article 4(b); the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, from 1999; and the AU Non-Aggression and Defence Pact, from 2005; as well as the communiquรฉ regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya to the Sahel and the rest of Africa, adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2021. The AU plays a key role across the continent in promoting good governance of the security sector. The Political Framework on Security Sector Reform in 2014, related to the regulation of the private security sector, including non-state security bodies, was adopted. The AU deplores the use of PMSCs by AU Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and their international partners, who must comply with international, regional, and national frameworks. The AU also emphasises the need for AU Member States to develop a holistic approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the field of PMSCs to ensure that legal, political, and policy frameworks reflect good governance of PMSCs, making them more effective and accountable, both at the organisational and operational levels, in line with international and regional SSG/R standards.
Conclusion
It is evident that the complex and evolving international context of the post-Cold War era, as well as the events of September 11, 2001, marked an irreversible shift in the global expansion of private security and the fight against terrorism in Africa, characterised by the involvement of private military and security companies (PSMCs) in counter-terrorism operations, increasingly playing a major role in intelligence, counter-terrorism surveillance (CTS), counter-insurgency (COIN), and risk management related to the terrorist threat. Despite this, the involvement of PSMCs in the fight against terrorism poses major constraints regarding security dependence and the loss of national sovereignty since these firms are tied to the foreign policy agenda of their countries of origin and are often an instrument of competition between major powers in Africa. Thus, to address such ethical and moral concerns, aiming to promote respect for international humanitarian law (IHL), the African Union has established an intergovernmental framework that sets international legal obligations and best practices for PSMCs with a holistic approach to security sector reform (SSR).
